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Abstract 
There is evidence of a negative cross-country correlation between gender wage and employment gaps. We argue 
that non-random selection of women into work explains an important part of such correlation and thus of the 
observed variation in wage gaps. The idea is that, if women who are employed tend to have relatively high-wage 
characteristics, low female employment rates may become consistent with low gender wage gaps simply 
because low-wage women would not feature in the observed wage distribution. We explore this idea across the 
US and EU countries estimating gender gaps in potential wages. We recover information on wages for those not 
in work in a given year using alternative imputation techniques. Imputation is based on (i) wage observations 
from nearest available waves in the sample, (ii) observable characteristics of the nonemployed and (iii) a 
statistical repeated-sampling model. We then estimate median wage gaps on the resulting imputed wage 
distributions, thus simply requiring assumptions on the position of the imputed wage observations with respect 
to the median, but not on their level. We obtain higher median wage gaps on imputed rather than actual wage 
distributions for most countries in the sample. However, this difference is small in the US, the UK and most 
central and northern EU countries, and becomes sizeable in Ireland, France and southern EU, all countries in 
which gender employment gaps are high. In particular, correction for employment selection explains more than 
a half of the observed correlation between wage and employment gaps. 
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1 Introduction
There is substantial international variation in gender pay gaps, from 25-30 log points in the US and
the UK, to 10-20 log points in a number of central and northern European countries, down to an
average of 10 log points in southern Europe. International diﬀerences in overall wage dispersion are
typically found to play a role in explaining the variation in gender pay gaps (Blau and Kahn 1996,
2003). The idea is that a given level of dissimilarities between the characteristics of working men
and women translates into a higher gender wage gap the higher the overall level of wage inequality.
However, OECD (2002, chart 2.7) shows that, while diﬀerences in the wage structure do explain an
important portion of the international variation in gender wage gaps, the inequality-adjusted wage
gap in southern Europe remains lower than in the rest of Europe and in the US.
In this paper we argue that, besides diﬀerences in wage inequality and therefore in the returns
associated to characteristics of working men and women, a significant portion of the international
variation in gender wage gaps may be explained by diﬀerences in characteristics themselves, whether
observed or unobserved. This idea is supported by the striking international variation in employ-
ment gaps, ranging from 10 percentage points in the US, UK and Scandinavian countries, to 15-25
points in northern and central Europe, up to 30-40 points in southern Europe and Ireland. If
selection into employment is non-random, it makes sense to worry about the way in which selection
may aﬀect the resulting gender wage gap. In particular, if women who are employed tend to have
relatively high-wage characteristics, low female employment rates may become consistent with low
gender wage gaps simply because low-wage women would not feature in the observed wage distri-
bution. This idea could be thus well suited to explain the observed negative correlation between
gender wage and employment gaps that we observe in the data (see Figure 1).
Diﬀerent patterns of employment selection across countries may in turn stem from a number
of factors. First, there may be international diﬀerences in labor supply behavior and in particular
in the role of household composition and/or social norms in aﬀecting participation. Second, labor
demand mechanisms, including social attitudes towards female employment and their potential
eﬀects on employer choices, may be at work, aﬀecting both the arrival rate and the level of wage
oﬀers of the two genders. Finally, institutional diﬀerences in labor markets regarding unionization
and minimum wages may truncate the wage distribution at diﬀerent points in diﬀerent countries,
aﬀecting both the composition of employment and the observed wage distribution. In this paper
we will be agnostic as regards the separate role of these factors in shaping gender gaps, and aim at
recovering alternative measures of selection-corrected gender wage gaps.
Although there exist substantial literatures on gender wage gaps on one hand, and gender
employment, unemployment and participation gaps on the other hand,1 to our knowledge the
variation in both quantities and prices in the labor market has not been simultaneously exploited
1See Altonji and Blank (1999) for an overall survey on both employment and gender gaps for the US, Blau
and Kahn (2003) for international comparisons of gender wage gaps and Azmat, Güell and Manning (2004) for
international comparisons of unemployment gaps.
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to understand important diﬀerences in gender gaps across countries. In this paper we claim that
the international variation in gender employment gaps can indeed shed some light on well-known
cross-country diﬀerences in gender wage gaps. In particular, we explore this view by estimating
selection-corrected wage gaps.
In our empirical analysis we aim at recovering the counterfactual wage distribution that would
prevail in the absence of non-random selection into work - or at least some of its characteristics.
In order to do this, we recover information on wages for those not in work in a given year using
alternative imputation techniques. Our approach is closely related to that of Johnson, Kitamura
and Neal (2000) and Neal (2004), and simply requires assumptions on the position of the imputed
wage observations with respect to the median. Importantly, it does not require assumptions on
the actual level of missing wages, as typically required in the matching approach, nor it requires
arbitrary exclusion restrictions often invoked in two-stage Heckman sample selection correction
models.
We then estimate unadjusted median wage gaps on the sample of employed workers (our base
sample) and on a sample enlarged with wage imputation for the nonemployed, in which selection
issues are alleviated. The impact of selection into work on estimated wage gaps is assessed by
comparing estimates obtained under alternative sample inclusion rules. The attractive feature of
median regressions is that, if missing wage observations fall completely on one or the other side
of the median regression line, the results are only aﬀected by the position of wage observations
with respect to the median, and not by specific values of imputed wages. One can therefore make
assumptions motivated by economic theory on whether an individual who is not in work should
have a wage observation below or above median wages for their gender.
Imputation can be performed in several ways. First, we use panel data and, for all those not
in work in some base year, we search backward and forward to recover hourly wage observations
from the nearest wave in the sample. This is equivalent to assuming that an individual’s position
with respect to the base-year median can be recovered by the ranking of her wage from the nearest
wave in the base-year distribution. As such position is determined using levels of wages in other
waves in the sample, we are in practice allowing for selection on unobservables.
While imputation based on this procedure arguably uses the minimum set of potentially arbi-
trary assumptions, it has the disadvantage of not providing any wage information on individuals
who never worked during the sample period. To recover wage observations also for those never
observed in work, we make assumptions on their position with respect to the median, based on
their observable characteristics, specifically education, experience and spouse income. In this case
we are allowing for selection on observable characteristics only. Having done this, earlier or later
wage observations for those with imputed wages in the base year can shed light on the goodness of
our imputation methods.
Finally, we extend the framework of Johnston et al. (2000) and Neal (2004) by using probability
models for assigning individuals on either side of the median of the wage distribution. We first esti-
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mate the probability of each individual belonging above or below their gender-specific median using
a simple human capital specification. Individuals are then assigned above- or below-median wages
according to such predicted probabilities, using repeated imputation techniques (Rubin, 1987).
More specifically, the missing wage values are replaced by (a small number of) simulated versions,
thus obtaining independent simulated datasets. The estimated wage gaps on each of the simulated
complete datasets are combined to produce estimates and confidence intervals that incorporate
missing-data uncertainty. This method has the advantage of using all available information on the
characteristics of the nonemployed and of taking into account uncertainty about the reason for
missing wage information.
In our study we use panel data sets that are as comparable as possible across countries, namely
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the US and the European Community Household
Panel Survey (ECHPS) for Europe. We consider the period 1994-2001, the longest time span
for which data are available for all countries. Our estimates deliver higher median wage gaps
on imputed rather than actual wage distributions for most countries in the sample, and across
alternative imputation methods. This implies, as one would have expected, that women tend on
average to be more positively selected into work than men. However, the diﬀerence between actual
and potential wage gaps is small in the US, the UK and most central and northern European
countries, and becomes sizeable in Ireland, France and southern Europe, i.e. countries in which
the gender employment gap is highest. In other words, correcting for selection into employment
explains more than half of the observed negative correlation between gender wage and employment
gaps. In particular, in Spain, Portugal and Greece the median wage gap on the imputed wage
distribution reaches closely comparable levels to those of the US and of other central and northern
European countries.
Our results thus show that, while the raw wage gap is much higher in Anglo Saxon countries than
in Ireland and southern Europe, the reason is probably not to be found in more equal pay treatment
for women in the latter group of countries, but mainly in a diﬀerent process of selection into
employment. Female participation rates in catholic countries and Greece are low and concentrated
among high-wage women. Having corrected for lower participation rates, the wage gap there widens
to similar levels to those of other European countries and the US.
We also estimate wage gaps adjusted for characteristics on both actual and imputed wage dis-
tributions and perform Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions of wage gaps. Countries whose gender wage
gap is not seriously aﬀected by sample inclusion rules also have a roughly unchanged gap decompo-
sition across specifications. In countries where wage imputation indeed aﬀects the estimated wage
gap, the importance of characteristics becomes larger relative to that of estimated returns. This
confirms the importance of selection along a limited number of observables. Finally, in order to
relate our findings with those of the existing literature on wage gaps and overall wage dispersion,
we adopt the method proposed by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991) and Blau and Kahn (1996) to
decompose international diﬀerences in wage gaps into diﬀerences in characteristics, both observed
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and unobserved, and diﬀerences in (male) returns to these characteristics. Overall we find that the
contribution of characteristics relative to that of the wage structure is much stronger in southern
Europe than elsewhere. This eﬀect is attenuated on the imputed wage distribution.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the related literature. Section 3
describes the data sets used and presents descriptive evidence on gender gaps. Section 4 describes
our imputation and estimation methodologies. Section 5 estimates median gender wage gaps on
actual and imputed wage distributions, to illustrate how alternative sample selection rules aﬀect
the estimated gaps. Section 6 discusses decompositions of international diﬀerences in wage gaps.
Conclusions are brought together in Section 7.
2 Related work
The importance of selectivity biases in making wage comparisons has long been recognized since
seminal work by Gronau (1974) and Heckman (1974). The current literature contains a number of
country-level studies that estimate selection-corrected wage gaps across genders or ethnic groups,
based on a variety of correction methodologies. Among studies that are more closely related to
our paper, Neal (2004) estimates the gap in potential earnings between black and white women
in the US by fitting median regressions on imputed wage distributions, using alternative methods
of wage imputation for women non employed in 1990. He finds that “the black-white gap in
log-potential wages among young adult women in 1990 was at least 60 percent larger than the
gap implied by reported earnings and hours worked”, thus revealing that black women are more
strongly selected into work according to high-wage characteristics. Using both wage imputation
and matching techniques, Chandra (2003) finds that the wage gap between black and white US
males was also understated, due to selective withdrawal of black men from the labor force during
the 1970s and 1980s.2
Turning to gender wage gaps, Blau and Kahn (2004) study changes in the US gender wage gap
between 1979 and 1998 and find that sample selection implies that the 1980s gains in women’s
relative wage oﬀers were overstated, and that selection may also explain part of the slowdown
in convergence between male and female wages in the 1990s. Their approach is based on wage
imputation for those not in work, along the lines of Neal (2004). Mulligan and Rubinstein (2004)
also argue that the narrowing of the gender wage gap in the US during 1964-2002 may be a direct
impact of progressive selection into employment of high-wage women, in turn attracted by widening
within-gender wage dispersion. This idea follows the implications of the Roy’s (1951) model, as
applied to the choice between market and non-market work in the presence of rising dispersion
in the returns to market work. Correction for selection into work is implemented here using a
two-stage Heckman (1979) selection model.
2See also Blau and Beller (1992) and Juhn (2003) for earlier use of matching techniques in the study of selection-
corrected race gaps.
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Related work on European countries includes Blundell, Gosling, Ichimura and Meghir (2004),
Albrecht, van Vuuren and Vroman (2003) and Beblo, Beninger, Heinze and Laisney (2003). Blundell
et al. examine changes in the distribution of wages in the UK during 1978-2000. They allow for the
impact of non-random selection into work by using bounds to the latent wage distribution according
to the procedure proposed by Manski (1994). Bounds are first constructed based on the worst case
scenario and then progressively tightened using restrictions motivated by economic theory. Features
of the resulting wage distribution are then analyzed, including overall wage inequality, returns to
education, and gender wage gaps. Albrecht et al. estimate gender wage gaps in the Netherlands
having corrected for selection of women into market work according to the Buchinsky’s (1998)
semi-parametric method for quantile regressions. They find evidence of strong positive selection
into full-time employment: were all Dutch women working full-time, the gender wage gap would
be much higher. Finally, Beblo et al. show selection corrected wage gaps for Germany using both
the Heckman (1979) and the Lewbel (2002) two-stage selection models. They find that correction
for selection has an ambiguous impact on gender wage gaps in Germany, depending on the method
used.
Interestingly, most of the studies cited find that correction for selection has important conse-
quences for our assessment of gender wage gaps. At the same time, none of these studies use data
from southern European countries, where employment rates of women are lowest, and thus the se-
lection issue should be most relevant. In this paper we use data for the US and for a representative
group of European countries to investigate how non-random selection into work may have aﬀected
the gender wage gap.
3 Data
3.1 The PSID
Our analysis for the US is based on the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). This
is a longitudinal survey of a representative sample of US individuals and their households. It has
been ongoing since 1968. The data were collected annually through 1997 and every other year after
1997. In order to ensure consistency with European data, we use five waves from the PSID, from
1994 to 2001. We restrict our analysis to individuals aged 16-64, having excluded the self-employed,
full-time students, and individuals in the armed forces.3
The wage concept that we use throughout the analysis is the gross hourly wage. This is given
by annual labor income divided by annual hours worked in the calendar year before the interview
date. Employed workers are defined as those with positive hours worked in the previous year.
3The exclusion of self-employed individuals may require some justification, in so far the incidence of self employment
varies importantly across genders and countries, as well as the associated earnings gap. However, the available
definition of income for the self employed is not comparable to the one we are using for the employees and the
number of observations for the self employed is very limited for European countries. Both these factors prevent us
from including the self-employed in our analysis.
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The characteristics that we exploit for wage imputation for the nonemployed are human capital
variables, spouse income and nonemployment status, i.e. unemployed versus out of the labor force.
Human capital is proxied by education and work experience controls. Ethnic origin is not included
here as information on ethnicity is not available for the European sample. We consider three broad
educational categories: less than high school, high school completed, and college completed. They
include individuals who have completed less than twelve years of schooling, between twelve and
fifteen years of schooling, and at least sixteen years of schooling, respectively. This categorization
of the years of schooling variable is chosen for consistency with the definition of education in the
ECHPS, which does not provide information on completed years of schooling, but only on recognized
qualifications.
Information on work experience refers to years of actual labor market experience (either full-
or part-time) since the age of 18. When individuals first join the PSID panel as a head or a wife
(or cohabitor), they are asked how many years they worked since age 18, and how many of these
years involved full-time work. These two questions are also asked retrospectively in 1974 and 1985,
irrespective of the year in which they had joined the sample. The answers to these questions form
the base from which we calculate actual work experience, following the procedure of Blau and Kahn
(2004). Given the initial values of work experience, we update work experience for the years of
interest using the longitudinal work history file from the PSID. For example, in order to construct
the years of actual experience in 1994 for an individual who was in the survey in 1985, we add to
the number of years of experience reported in 1985 the number of years between 1985 and 1994
during which they worked a positive number of hours.4 This procedure allows one to construct the
full work experience in each year until 1997. As the survey became biannual after 1997, there is
no information on the number of hours worked by individuals between 1997 and 1998 and between
1999 and 2000. We fill missing work experience information for 1998 following again Blau and Kahn
(2004). In particular, we use the 1999 sample to estimate logit models for positive hours in the
previous year and in the year preceding the 1997 survey, separately for males and females. The
explanatory variables are race, schooling, experience, a marital status indicator and variables for
the number of children aged 0-2, 3-5, 6-10, and 11-15, who are living in the household at the time
of the interview. Work experience in the missing year is obtained as the average of the predicted
values in the 1999 logit and the 1997 logit. We repeat the same steps for filling missing work
experience information in 2000.
Spouse income is constructed as the sum of total labor and business income in unincorporated
enterprises both for spouses and cohabitors of respondents. Finally, the reason for nonemployment,
i.e. unemployment versus inactivity, is given by self-reported information on employment status.
When estimating adjusted wage gaps, we control for human capital and job characteristics.
In particular, our wage equation includes controls for education, work experience, industry and
4The measure of actual experience used here includes both full-time and part-time work experience, as this is
better comparable to the measure of experience available from the ECHPS.
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occupation. We consider 12 occupational categories, based on the 3-digits occupation codes from
the 1970 Census of the Population, and 12 industries. We also include 51 state dummies and
year dummies. The results obtained on this specification were not sensitive to the inclusion of
controls for ethnic origin, which are thus left out for consistency with the specification estimated
for European countries.
3.2 The ECHPS
Data for European countries are drawn from the European Community Household Panel Survey.
This is an unbalanced household-based panel survey, containing annual information on a few thou-
sands households per country during the period 1994-2001.5 The ECHPS has the advantage that
it asks a consistent set of questions across the 15 members states of the pre-enlargement EU. The
Employment section of the survey contains information on the jobs held by members of selected
households, including wages and hours of work. The household section allows to obtain information
on the family composition of respondents. We exclude Sweden and Luxembourg from our country
set, as wage information is unavailable for Sweden in all waves, and unavailable for Luxembourg
after 1996.
As for the US, we restrict our analysis of wages to employed workers aged 16-64 as of the survey
date, and exclude the self-employed, those in full-time education and the military. The definition
of variables used replicates quite closely that used for the US.
The EU education categories are: less than upper secondary high school, upper secondary
school completed, and higher education. These correspond to ISCED 0-2, 3, and 5-7, respectively.
Unfortunately, no information on actual experience is available in the ECHPS, and we use a measure
of potential work experience, computed as the current age of an individual, minus the age at which
she started her working life. Spouse income is computed as the sum of labor and non-labor annual
income for spouses or cohabitors of respondents. Finally, unemployment status is determined using
self-reported information on the main activity status.
When estimating adjusted wage gaps, our wage equation specification is as close as possible to
that estimated for the US, subject to slight data diﬀerences. Besides diﬀerences in the definition
for work experience, the occupational and industrial classification of individuals is slightly diﬀerent
from the one used for the PSID. In particular, we consider 18 industries and 9 broad occupational
groups: although this is not the finest occupational disaggregation available in the ECHPS, it is
the one that allows the best match with the occupational classification available in the PSID. We
finally control for region of residence at the NUT1 level, meaning 11 regions for the UK, 1 for
Finland and Denmark, 15 for Germany, 1 for the Netherlands, 3 for Belgium and Austria, 2 for
5The initial sample sizes are as follows. Austria: 3,380; Belgium: 3490; Denmark: 3,482; Finland: 4,139; France:
7,344; Germany: 11,175; Greece: 5,523; Ireland: 4,048; Italy: 7,115; Luxembourg: 1,011; Netherlands: 5,187;
Portugal: 4,881; Spain: 7,206; Sweden: 5,891; U.K.: 10,905. These figures are the number of household included in
the first wave for each country, which corresponds to 1995 for Austria, 1996 for Finland, 1997 for Sweden, and 1994
for all other countries.
8
Ireland, 8 for France, 12 for Italy, 7 for Spain, 2 for Portugal and 4 for Greece.
All descriptive statistics for both the US and the EU samples are reported in Table A1.
3.3 Descriptive evidence on gender gaps
Table 1 reports raw gender gaps in log gross hourly wages and employment rates for all coun-
tries in our sample. All these are computed for the population aged 16-64. At the risk of some
oversimplification, one can classify countries in three broad categories according to their levels of
gender wage gaps. In the US and the UK men’s hourly wages are 25 to 30 log points higher than
women’s hourly wages. Next, in northern and central Europe the gender wage gap in hourly wages
is between 10 and 20 log points, from a minimum of 11 log points in Denmark, to a maximum of
24 log points in the Netherlands. Finally, in southern European countries the gender wage gap is
on average 10 log points, from 6.3 in Italy to 13.4 in Spain. Such gaps in hourly wages display
a roughly negative correlation with gaps in employment to population rates. Employment gaps
range from 10 percentage points in the US, the UK and Scandinavia,6 to 15-25 points in northern
and central Europe, up to 30-40 points in southern Europe and Ireland. The relationship between
wage and employment gaps is represented in Figure 1. The coeﬃcient of correlation between them
is -0.497 and is significant at the 7% level.
Such negative correlation between wage and employment gaps may reveal significant sample
selection eﬀects in observed wage distributions. If the probability of an individual being at work
is positively aﬀected by the level of her potential wage oﬀers, and this mechanism is stronger for
women than for men, then high gender employment gaps become consistent with relatively low
gender wage gaps simply because low wage women are relatively less likely than men to feature in
observed wage distributions.
Table 1 also reports wage and employment gaps across three schooling levels. Employment
gaps everywhere decline with educational levels, if anything more strongly in southern Europe
than elsewhere. On the other hand, the relationship between gender wage gaps and education
varies across countries. While the wage gap is either flat or rises slightly with education in most
countries, it falls sharply with education in Ireland and southern Europe. In particular, if one
looks at the low-education group, the wage gap in southern Europe is closely comparable to that of
other countries - while being much lower for the high-education group. However, the fact that the
low-education group has the lowest weight in employment makes the overall wage gap substantially
lower in southern Europe.
Interestingly, in the four southern European countries, the overall wage gap is smaller than
each of the education-specific gaps, and thus lower than their weighted average. One can think of
this diﬀerence in terms of an omitted variable bias. The overall gap is simply the coeﬃcient on
the male dummy in a wage equation that only controls for gender. The weighted average of the
6Similarly as in other Scandinavian countries, the employment gap in Sweden over the same sample period is 5.2
percentage points.
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three education-specific gaps would be the coeﬃcient on the male dummy in a wage equation that
controls for both gender and education. Education would thus be an omitted variable in the first
regression, and the induced bias has the sign of the correlation between education and the male
dummy, given that the correlation between education and the error term is positive. While the
overall correlation between education and the male dummy tends to be positive in all countries, such
correlation becomes negative and fairly strong among the employed in southern Europe, lowering
the overall wage gap below each of the education-specific wage gaps. The fact that, conditional
on being employed, southern European women tend to be more educated than men may be itself
interpreted as a signal of selection into employment based on high-wage characteristics.
In Table 1A we report similar gaps for the population aged 25-54, as international diﬀerences in
schooling and/or retirement systems may have aﬀected relevant gaps for the 16-64 sample. However,
when comparing the figures of Table 1 and 2, we do not find evidence of important discrepancies
between the gender gaps computed for those aged 16-64 and those aged 25-54. The rest of our
analysis therefore uses the population sample aged 16-64.
4 Methodology
We are interested in measuring the gender wage gap:
D = E (w|X,male)−E (w|X, female) , (1)
where D denotes the gender gap in mean log wages, w denotes log wages and X is a vector of
observable characteristics. Average wages for each gender are given by:
E (w|X, g) = E (w|X, g, I = 1)Pr(I = 1|X, g) +E (w|X, g, I = 0) [1− Pr(I = 1|X, g)], (2)
where I is an indicator function that equals 1 if an individual is employed and zero otherwise
and g =male, female. Wage gaps estimated on observed wage distributions are based on the
E (w|X, g, I = 1) term alone. If there are systematic diﬀerences between E (w|X, g, I = 1) and
E (w|X, g, I = 0), cross-country variation in Pr(I = 1|X, g)may translate into misleading inferences
concerning the international variation in potential wage oﬀers. This problem typically aﬀects esti-
mates of female wage equations; even more so when one is interested in cross-country comparisons
of gender wage gaps, given the cross-country variation in Pr(I = 1|X,male)− Pr(I = 1|X,female),
measuring the gender employment gap. Our goal is to retrieve gender gaps in potential (oﬀer)
wages, as illustrated in (1), where E (w|X, g) is given by (2). For this purpose, the data provide
information on both E (w|X, g, I = 1) and Pr(I = 1|X, g), but clearly not on E (w|X, g, I = 0) , as
wages are only observed for those who are in work.
A number of approaches can be used to correct for non-random sample selection in wage equa-
tions and/or recover the distribution in potential wages. The seminal approach suggested by Heck-
man (1974, 1979) consists in allowing for selection on unobservables, i.e. on variables that do not
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feature in the wage equation but that are observed in the data.7 Heckman’s two-stage parametric
specifications have been used extensively in the literature in order to correct for selectivity bias in
female wage equations. More recently, these have been criticized for lack of robustness and distrib-
utional assumptions (see Manski 1989). Approaches that circumvent most of the criticism include
semi-parametric selection correction models that appeared in the literature since the early 1980s
(see Vella 1998 for an extensive survey of both parametric and non-parametric sample selection
models). Two-stage nonparametric methods allow in principle to approximate the bias term by a
series expansion of propensity scores from the selection equation, with the qualification that the
term of order zero in the polynomial is not separately identified from the constant term in the
wage equation, unless some additional information is available (see Buchinski 1998). Usually, the
constant term in the wage regression is identified from a subset of workers for which the probability
of work is close to one, but in our case this route is not feasible since for no type of women the
probability of working is close to one in all countries.
Selection on observed characteristics is instead exploited in the matching approach, which con-
sists in imputing wages for the non-employed by assigning them the observed wages of the employed
with matching characteristics (see Blau and Beller 1992 and Juhn 1992, 2003).
The approach of this paper is also based on some form of wage imputation for the non-employed,
but it simply requires assumptions on the position of the imputed wage observations with respect
to the median of the wage distribution, and not on their level, as in Johnson et al. (2000) and
Neal (2004).8 We then estimate median wage gaps on the resulting imputed wage distributions,
i.e. on the enlarged wage distribution that is obtained implementing alternative wage imputation
methods for the nonemployed. The attractive feature of median regressions is that, if missing
wage observations fall completely on one or the other side of the median regression line, the results
are only aﬀected by the position of wage observations with respect to the median, and not by
specific values of imputed wages, as it would be in the matching approach. One can therefore make
assumptions motivated by economic theory on whether an individual who is not in work should have
a wage observation below or above median wages, conditional on characteristics. When estimating
raw gender wage gaps, the only characteristic included is a gender dummy. Thus one should make
assumptions on whether a nonemployed individual should earn above- or below-median wages for
their gender.
More formally, let’s consider the linear wage equation
wi = Xiβ + εi, (3)
7 In this framework, wages of employed and nonemployed would be recovered as
E (w|X, g, I = 1) = Xβ +E (ε1|ε0 > −Zγ)
E (w|X, g, I = 0) = Xβ +E (ε1|ε0 < −Zγ) ,
respectively, where Z is the set of covariates used in the selection equation, with associated parameters γ, and ε1 and
ε0 are the error terms in the wage and the selection equation, respectively.
8See also Chandra (2003) for a non-parametric application to racial wage gaps among US men.
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where wi denotes (log) wage oﬀers, Xi denotes characteristics - including gender, with associated
coeﬃcients β, and εi is an error term such thatMed (εi|Xi) = 0. Let’s denote by βˆ the hypothetical
LAD estimator based on true wage oﬀers. However, wage oﬀers wi are only observed for the
employed, and missing for non-employed. If missing wage oﬀers fall completely below the median
regression line, i.e. wi < Xibβ for the non-employed (Ii = 0), one can then define a transformed
dependent variable yi that is equal to wi for Ii = 1 and to some arbitrarily low imputed value ewi
for Ii = 0, and the following result holds:
βˆimputed ≡ argminβ
NX
i=1
|yi −X 0iβ| = βˆ ≡ argminβ
NX
i=1
|wi −X 0iβ|. (4)
Condition (4) states that the LAD estimator is not aﬀected by imputation (see Johnson et al. 2000
for details). Clearly, (4) also holds when missing wage oﬀers fall completely above the median
regression line, i.e. wi < Xibβ, and yi is set equal to some arbitrarily high imputed value ewi for the
non-employed. More in general, the LAD estimator is also not aﬀected by imputation when missing
wage oﬀers fall on both sides of the median, provided that observations on either side are imputed
correctly, and that the median does not fall within either of the imputed sets. For example, suppose
that the potential wages of the non-employed could be classified in two groups, A and B, such that
wi > Xibβ for i ∈ A and wi < Xibβ for i ∈ B, i.e. the predicted median does not belong to A or B.
If yi is set equal to some arbitrarily high value for all i ∈ A and equal to some arbitrarily low value
for all i ∈ B, LAD inference is still valid.
It should be noted, however, that in order to use median regressions to evaluate gender wage
gaps in (1) one should assume that the mean and the median of the (log) wage distribution coincide,
in other words that the (log) wage distribution is symmetric. This is clearly true for the log-normal
distribution, which is typically assumed in Mincerian wage equations. In what follows we therefore
assume that the distribution of oﬀer wages is log-normal.9
Having said this, imputation can be performed in several ways, which we describe below.
Imputation on unobservables. We first exploit the panel nature of our data sets and, for all
those not in work in some base year, we recover hourly wage observations from the nearest wave
in the sample. The underlying identifying assumption is that an individual’s position with respect
to the base-year median can be recovered looking at the level of her wage in the nearest wave. As
the position with respect to the median is determined using levels of wages in other waves in the
sample, we are allowing for selection on unobservables.
9 If one does not impose symmetry of the (log) wage distribution, the equivalent of (2) would be
Med (w|X, g) = F−1(1/2)
= F−1 {F [Med (w|X, g, I = 1)]Pr(I = 1|X, g) + F [Med (w|X, g, I = 1)] [1− Pr(I = 1|X, g)]}
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This procedure of imputation makes sense when an individual’s position in the latent wage
distribution stays on the same side of the median across adjacent waves in the panel. In other
words, as we estimate median wage gaps, we do not need an assumption of stable rank throughout
the whole wage distribution, but only with respect to the median. It may be interesting to interpret
our identifying assumption in the context of the framework developed by Di Nardo, Fortin and
Lemieux (1996) in order to estimate counterfactual densities of wages. In doing this, they assume
that the structure of wages, conditional on a set of individual characteristics, does not depend on
the distribution of characteristics themselves, i.e. it would be the same both in the actual and
the counterfactual states of the world. If our objective were to recover the counterfactual density
of wages that would be observed if all individuals were in work, we would need to assume that
the distribution of wage oﬀers, conditional on gender, were the same whether one is employed or
nonemployed. However, as we aim at recovering just the median of such counterfactual density
of wages, conditional on gender, we need a much weaker identifying assumption, namely that the
cumulative density of wages up to the median be the same in the actual and counterfactual states
of the world. In other words, we require individuals to remain on the same side of the median of
the potential wage distribution for their gender when switching employment status.
While imputation based on this procedure arguably exploits the minimum set of potentially
arbitrary assumptions, it has the disadvantage of not providing any wage information on individuals
who never worked during the sample period. It is therefore important to understand in which
direction this problem may distort, if at all, the resulting median wage gaps. If women are on
average less attached to the labor market than men, and if individuals who are less attached have on
average lower wage characteristics than the fully attached, then the diﬀerence between the median
gender wage gap on the imputed and the actual wage distribution tends to be higher the higher the
proportion of imputed wage observations in total non-employment in the base year. Consider for
example a country with very persistent employment status: those who do not work in the base year
and are therefore less attached are less likely to work at all in the whole sample period. In this case
low wage observations for the less attached are less likely to be recovered, and the estimated wage
gap is likely to be lower. Proportions of imputed wage observations over the total non-employed
population in 1999 (our base year) are reported in Table A2: the diﬀerential between male and
female proportions tends to be higher in Germany, Austria, France and southern Europe than
elsewhere. Under reasonable assumptions we should therefore expect the diﬀerence between the
median wage gap on the imputed and the actual wage distribution to be biased downward relatively
more in this set of countries. This in turn means that we are being relatively more conservative in
assessing the eﬀect of non-random employment selection in these countries than elsewhere.
Even so, it would of course be preferable to recover wage observations also for those never
observed in work during the whole sample period. To do this, we rely on the observed characteristics
of the nonemployed.
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Imputation on observables. We perform imputation based on observable characteristics in
two ways. First, we can recover wage observations for the non-employed by making assumptions
about whether they place above or below the median wage oﬀer, based on a small number of char-
acteristics, specifically employment status (unemployed versus out of the labor force), education,
work experience and spouse income. While this method for placing individuals with respect to the
median follows a sort of educated guess, based on their observable characteristics, we can again use
wage information from adjacent waves in the panel to assess the goodness of such guess.
We also use probability models for imputation of missing wage observations, based on Rubin’s
(1987) two-step methodology for repeated imputation inference.10 In the first step a statistical
model is chosen for wage imputation, which should be closely related to the nature of the missing-
data problem. In the second step one obtains (a small number of) repeated and independent
imputed samples. The final estimate for the statistic of interest is obtained by averaging the
estimates across all rounds of imputation. The associated variances take into account variation
both within and between imputations (see the Appendix for details).
In the first step we use multivariate analysis in order to estimate the probability of an individ-
ual’s belonging above or below the median of the wage distribution. In particular, on the sub-sample
of employed workers we build an indicator function Mi that is equal to one for individuals whose
wage is higher than the median of the observed wage distribution for their gender and zero oth-
erwise. We then estimate a probit model for Mi, with explanatory variables Zi that are available
for both the employed and the non-employed sub-samples, typically human capital controls. Using
the probit estimates we obtain predicted probabilities of having a latent wage above the median
given characteristics, Pˆi = Pr(Mi = 1|Xi), for the nonemployed subset, where the X vector simply
includes a gender dummy. This imputation procedure is grounded in economic theory, as we would
expect that individuals with a relatively high level of educational attainment or work experience
would be more likely to feature in the upper half of the wage distribution. The predicted probabil-
ities Pˆi are then used in the second step as sampling weights for the nonemployed. That is, in each
of the independent imputed samples, employed individuals feature with their observed wage, and
nonemployed individuals feature with a wage above median with probability Pˆi and a wage below
median with probability 1− Pˆi.
The repeated imputation procedure eﬀectively uses all the information available for individuals
who are not observed in work at the time of survey. We compare this methodology to what may
be defined as simple imputation. That is, having estimated predicted probabilities Pˆi of belonging
above the median for those not in work, we assign them wages above the median if Pˆi > 0.5 and
below otherwise. This simple imputation procedure tends to overestimate the median gender wage
10See Rubin (1987) for an extended analysis of this technique and Rubin (1996) for a survey of more recent
developments. The repeated imputation technique was developed by Rubin as a general solution to the statistical
problem of missing data in large surveys, being mostly due to non-reponses. Imputations can be created under
Bayesian rules, and repeated imputation methods can be interpreted as an approximate Bayesian inference for the
statistics of interest, based on observed data. In this paper, we abstract from Bayesian considerations and apply the
methodology in our non-Bayesian framework.
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gap on the imputed sample if there is a relatively large mass of non-employed women with Pˆi < 0.5
but very close to 0.5.
As discussed in Rubin (1987) one of the advantages of repeated imputation is that it reflects
uncertainty about the reason for missing information. While simple imputation techniques such as
regression or matching methods assign a value to the missing wage observation in a deterministic
way (given characteristics), repeated imputation is based on a probabilistic model, i.e. on repeated
random draws under our chosen model for non-employment. Hence, unlike simple imputation,
inference based on repeated imputation takes into account the additional variability underlying the
presence of missing values.
Similarly as when making imputation based on wage information from adjacent waves, we need
to assume some form of separability between the structure of wages and individual employment
status. In particular we need to assume that, conditional on our vector of attributes, individuals
stay on the same side of the median whether they are employed or nonemployed.
In both simple and repeated imputation, we initially estimate a probit model for the proba-
bility of belonging above or below the median of the observed wage distribution. However, due
precisely to the selection problem, such median may be quite diﬀerent from that of the potential
wage distribution, i.e. the median that would be observed if everyone were employed. This could
introduce important biases in our estimates on the imputed sample. In order to attenuate this
problem we also perform repeated and simple imputation on an expanded sample, augmented with
wage observations from adjacent waves. This allows us to get a better estimate of the “true” median
in the first step of our procedure, thus generating more appropriate estimates of the median wage
gap on the final, imputed sample. Note that in this case we are combining imputation on both
observables and unobservables.
It is worthwhile to discuss here the main diﬀerences between alternative imputation methods, also
in light of the interpretation of the results presented in the next section. Our imputation methods
diﬀer in terms of underlying identifying assumptions and of resulting imputed samples. The first
method, where missing wages are imputed using wage information form adjacent waves, implicitly
assumes that an individual’s position with respect to the median is proxied by their wage in the
nearest wave in the panel. In other words, if the position of individuals in the wage distribution
changes over time, any movements that happen within either side of the median do not invalidate
this method. With this procedure one can recover at best individuals who worked at least once
during the eight-year sample period. We thus want to emphasize that this is a fairly conservative
imputation procedure, in which we impute wages for individuals who are relatively weakly attached
to the labor market, but not for those who are completely unattached and thus never observed in
work. While this may aﬀect our estimates (and we will discuss how in the next section), this
procedure has the advantage of restricting imputation to a relatively “realistic” set of potential
workers.
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In the second and third imputation methods, we assume instead that an individual’s position
with respect to the median can be proxied by a small number of observable characteristics. In the
second method, we take educated guesses as to the position in the wage distribution of someone
with given characteristics. This procedure is more accurate the more conservative the criteria used
for imputation. For example, assigning individuals with college education above the median and
individuals with no qualifications below the median is more conservative but probably more accurate
than assigning all those with higher than average years of schooling above the median and all the
rest below the median. With this method, our imputed sample is typically larger than the one
obtained with the first method, although still substantially smaller than the existing population.
Finally, with the third method, we estimate the probability of belonging above the median for the
whole range of our vector of characteristics, thus recovering predicted probabilities and imputed
wages for the whole existing population - except of course those with missing characteristics.
Diﬀerent imputed samples will have an impact on our estimated median wage gaps. In so far
women are more likely to be non-employed than men, and non-employed individuals are more likely
to have received lower wage oﬀers than employed ones, the larger the imputed sample with respect
to the actual sample of employed workers, the larger the estimated gender wage gap on the imputed
sample with respect to that obtained on the sample of observed wages.
Having said this, it is important to stress that with all three imputation methods used there is
nothing that would tell a priori which way correction for selection is going to aﬀect the results. This
is ultimately determined by the wages that the nonemployed earned when they were previously (or
later) employed, and by their observable characteristics, depending on methods.
With these clarifications in mind, we move next to the description of our results.
5 Results
5.1 Imputation based on unobservables
Our first set of results refers to imputation based on unobservable characteristics. In other words.
an individual’s position with respect to the median of the wage distribution is proxied by the
position of their wage obtained from the nearest available wave.
The results are reported in Table 2. Column 1 reports raw (unadjusted) wage gaps for individ-
uals with hourly wage observations in 1999, which is our base year. These replicate very closely the
wage gaps reported in Table 1, with the only diﬀerence that mean wage gap for the whole sample
period are reported in Table 1, while median wage gaps for 1999 are reported here. As in Table
1, the US and the UK stand out as the countries with the highest wage gaps, followed by central
and northern Europe, and finally Scandinavia and Southern Europe. In column 2 missing wage
observations in 1999 are replaced with the real value of the nearest wage observation in a 2-year
window, while in column 3 they are replaced with the real value of the nearest wage observation
in the whole sample period, meaning a maximum window of [-5, +2] years. Comparing figures in
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columns 1-3, one can see that the median wage gap remains substantially unaﬀected or aﬀected
very little in the US, the UK, and a number of European countries down to Austria, and increases
substantially in Ireland, France and southern Europe, this latter group including countries with
the highest gender employment gap. While sample selection seems to be fairly neutral in a large
number of countries in our sample, or, in other words, selection in market work does not seem to
vary systematically with wage characteristics of individuals, it is mostly high-wage individuals who
work in catholic countries, and this seems to give a downward-biased estimate of the gender wage
gap when one does not account for non-random sample selection. Note finally that in Scandina-
vian countries and the Netherlands the wage gap in potential wages decreases slightly, if anything
providing evidence of an underlying selection mechanism of the opposite sign.
Arulampalan, Booth and Bryan (2004) find evidence of glass ceilings, defined as a diﬀerence of
at least 2 points between the 90th percentile (adjusted) wage gap and the 75th or the 50th per-
centile gap, in most European countries, and evidence of sticky floors, defined as a diﬀerence of at
least 2 points between the 10th percentile (adjusted) wage gap and the 25th or 50th percentile gap,
only in Germany, France, Italy and Spain (but report no evidence for Portugal or Greece). Sticky
floors for low-educated women in Spain are also documented by De La Rica, Dolado and Llorens
(2005). Similarly, our descriptive evidence of section 3.3 shows a strongly decreasing wage gap in
levels of education in southern Europe. High wage gaps at the bottom of the wage distribution in
some southern European countries may discourage employment participation of low-wage women
relatively more than in other countries. This would be consistent with a sizeable impact of employ-
ment selection at the bottom of the wage distribution in these countries, and our selection-corrected
estimates for the gender wage gap precisely go in this direction.
For each sample inclusion rule in column 1-3 one can compute the adjusted employment rate for
each gender, i.e. the proportion of the adult population that is either working or has an imputed
wage. These proportions are reported in columns 1-3 if Table 5. When moving from column 1 to
3, the fraction of women included increases substantially in southern Europe, and only slightly less
in countries like Germany or the UK, where the estimated wage sample is not greatly unaﬀected
by the sample inclusion rules. Moreover, there is also an increase in the fraction of men included
in the sample across imputation rules. It is thus not simply the lower female employment rate in
several countries that determines our findings, it is also the fact that in some countries selection
into work seems to be less correlated to wage characteristics than in others.
As one would expect from our cross-country results, controlling for selection removes most of
the observed negative correlation between wage and employment gaps. At the bottom of each
column in the Table 2 we compute the coeﬃcient of correlation between the wage gap in the
same column and the adjusted employment gap, as obtained from the relevant column of Table
5. The correlation coeﬃcient between unadjusted median wage gaps and employment gaps is -
0.455, and is significantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10% level. Using the adjusted estimates from
column 3, this falls to -0.181, and is not significantly diﬀerent from zero at standard levels. The
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importance of sample selection can also be grasped graphically by looking at Figure 2, which shows
the relationship between median wage and employment gaps, either unadjusted (estimates from
column 1) or selection-adjusted (estimates from column 3). While a downward-sloping pattern can
be detected in Panel A, Panel B rather shows a random scatter-plot.
The estimates of columns 2 and 3 do not control for aggregate wage growth over time. If
aggregate wage growth were homogeneous across genders and countries, then estimated wage gaps
based on wage observations for adjacent years would not be not aﬀected. But if there is a gender
diﬀerential in wage growth, and if such diﬀerential varies across countries, then simply using earlier
(later) wage observations would deliver a higher (lower) median wage gap in countries where women
have relatively lower wage growth with respect to men.11 We thus estimate real wage growth by
regressing log real hourly wages for each country and gender on a linear trend.12 The resulting
coeﬃcients are reported in Table A3. These are then used to adjust real wage observations outside
the base year and re-estimate median wage gaps. The resulting median wage gaps on the imputed
wage distribution are reported in column 4 and 5. Despite some diﬀerences in real wage growth
rates across genders and countries, adjusting estimated median wage gaps does not produce any
appreciable change in the results reported in columns 2 and 3, which do not control for real wage
growth.
Note that in Table 2 we are (at best) recovering on average 24% of the non-employed females
in the four southern European countries, as opposed to approximately 46% in the rest of countries
(see Table A2). For men, the respective proportions are 54% and 60%. Such diﬀerences happen
because (non)employment status tends to be more persistent in southern Europe than elsewhere,
and much more so for women than for men. As briefly noted in Section 3, given that we recover
relatively fewer less-attached women in southern Europe, we are being relatively more conservative
in assessing the eﬀect of non-random employment selection in southern Europe than elsewhere.
For this reason it is important to try to recover wage observations also for those never observed
in work in any wave of the sample period, as explained in the next section.
5.2 Imputation based on observables
In Table 3 we estimate median wage gaps on imputed wage distributions, making assumptions on
whether individuals who were nonemployed in 1999 had potential wage oﬀers above or below the
median for their gender. Column 1 reports for reference the median wage gap on the base sample,
which is the same as the one reported in column 1 of Table 2. In column 2 we assume that all
those not in work would have wage oﬀers below the median for their gender.13 This is an extreme
11Note however that, even if real wage growth were homogeneous across genders, imputation based on wage
observations from adjacent waves would not be aﬀected only if the proportion of men and women in the sample
remained unchanged after imputation.
12Of course, for our estimated rates of wage growth to be unbiased, this procedure requires that participation into
employment be unaﬀected by wage growth, which may not be the case.
13 In the practice, whenever we assign someone a wage below the median we pick ?wi = −5, this value being lower
than the minimum observed (log) wage for all countries, and thus lower than the median. Similarly, whenever we
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assumption, and should only be taken as a benchmark. This assumption is clearly violated in cases
like Italy, Spain and Greece, in which more than a half of the female sample is not in work in 1999,
as by definition all missing observations cannot fall below the median. For this reason we do not
report estimated gaps for these three countries. However, also for other countries there are reasons
to believe that not all nonemployed individuals would have wage oﬀers below their gender mean.
Of course, we cannot know exactly what wages these individuals would have received if they had
worked in 1999. But we can form an idea of the goodness of this assumption looking again at wage
observations (if any) for these individuals in all other waves of the panel. This allows us to compute
what proportion of imputed observations had at some point in time wages that were indeed below
their gender median. Such proportions are also presented separately for each gender in column 2.
They are fairly high for men, but sensibly lower for women, which makes the estimates based on
this extreme imputation case a benchmark rather than a plausible measure for the gender wage gap.
Having said this, estimated median wage gaps increase substantially for most countries, except the
UK and Scandinavia.
We next make imputations based on observed characteristics of nonemployed individuals. In
column 3 we impute wage below the median to all those who are unemployed (as opposed to non
participants) in 1999. With respect to the base sample, the implied median wage gap stays roughly
unchanged everywhere down to Austria, and increases substantially in Ireland, France and southern
Europe. Also, the proportion of “correctly” imputed observations, computed as for the previous
imputation case, is now much higher. Those who do not work because they are unemployed are
thus relatively more likely to be over-represented in the lower half of the wage distribution. In
column 4 we assume that all those with less than upper secondary education and less than 10 years
of potential labor market experience have wage observations below the median for their gender.
Those with at least higher education and at least 10 years of labor market experience are instead
placed above the median. The change in the estimated wage gap is similar as in column 3, and
so are the proportions of correctly imputed observations (except for some reason in the UK). The
next imputation method is implicitly based on the assumption of assortative mating and consists in
assigning wages below the median to those whose partner has total income in the bottom quartile of
the gender-specific distribution of total income. The results are broadly similar to those in column
3: the wage gap is mostly aﬀected in Ireland and southern Europe. It would be natural to perform
a similar exercise at the top of the distribution, by assigning a wage above the median to those
whose partner has total income in the top quartile. However, in this case the proportion of correctly
imputed observations was too low to rely on the assumption used for imputation.
We also make imputation based on characteristics to recover wage observations only for those
who never worked, using first use wage observations available from other waves, and then imputing
the remaining missing ones using education and experience information as done in column 4. The
results show again a much higher gender gap in Ireland, France, and southern Europe, and not
assign someone a wage above the median we pick ?wi = 20.
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much of a change elsewhere with respect to the base sample of column 1.
Similarly as with the previous imputation method, we report in columns 4-8 of Table 5 the
proportion of men and women included in our imputed samples. As expected, we are now able to
recover wage information for a higher fraction of the adult population.14 The correlations between
median wage gaps on the imputed wage distribution and the corresponding adjusted employment
gaps, reported in the bottom row of Table 3, are once again not significantly diﬀerent from zero at
standard significance levels.
We finally use a probabilistic model for assigning to individuals wages above or below their
gender median, using both simple and repeated imputation techniques. As mentioned above, this
involves a two-step procedure, using once more data for 1999 as our base year. In the first step
we estimate a probit model for the probability that an individual with a non-missing wage falls
above their gender median, given a set of characteristics. We consider two alternative specifications
for the probit regressions: a simple human capital specification that controls for education (two
dummies for upper secondary and higher education), experience and its square, and a more general
specification that also controls for marital status, the number of children of diﬀerent ages (between
0 and 2, 3 and 5, 6 and 10, and 11 and 15 years old), and the position of the spouse in their gender
specific distribution of total income (three dummies corresponding to the three highest quartiles).
Since the results of the exercise do not vary in any meaningful way across specifications, we only
report findings for the human capital specification. The estimated coeﬃcients for the first stage
probit regression conform to standard economic theory. Individuals with higher levels of educational
attainment and/or of labor market experience are more likely to feature in the top half of the wage
distribution.15
In the second step we use the estimated coeﬃcients from the probit regression to compute the
predicted probability that a missing wage observation falls above the gender median. We consider
two alternative mechanisms to impute wages. According to the first mechanism, which we define
as simple imputation, we impute a value of the wage above (below) the median if the predicted
probability is greater (smaller) than 0.5. This implies that a missing-wage observation is assigned
a value below median even if, she would only marginally feature in the bottom part of the wage
distribution.
In order to circumvent this problem, our second imputation mechanism is based on the repeated
imputation methodology discussed in Section 4. For its implementation we construct 20 indepen-
dent imputed samples. In each imputed sample, the employed feature with their observed wage,
and for each nonemployed individual we “draw” her position with respect to the median using the
predicted probability obtained from the probit model. In the practice we draw independent random
numbers from a uniform distribution with support [0,1] and assign a nonemployed worker a wage
above (below) the median if the random draw is lower (higher) than their predicted probability.
14 In column 4 such proportions are generally not equal to 100% because we did not impute wages to those who are
employed but have missing information on hourly wages.
15The results are available upon request from the authors.
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For each of the 20 samples we estimate the median gender wage gap and obtain the corresponding
bootstrapped standard error.16 For each country and specification, the estimated median wage
gap is then obtained by averaging the estimates across the 20 rounds of imputation. The standard
errors are adjusted to take into account both between and within-imputation variation (see the
Appendix for details).
The results for this exercise are summarized in Table 5. Column 1 reports the median wage
gap for the base sample, which is the same as the one reported in column 1 of Table 3. Column
2 reports the estimated median wage gap using simple imputation. In Column 3 we use simple
imputation to recover wage observations only for those who never worked in the sample period.
That is, we first use wage observations available from other waves to impute missing wages and
then impute the remaining missing ones as done in Column 2. Note that this procedure changes
the reference median wage: by expanding the wage sample using wage observations from adjacent
waves we are in practice able to compute a median wage that is closer to the latent median, i.e.
the median that one would observe if everybody were in work. For the results in Column 4 we use
both wages and human capital variables from adjacent waves, and then we impute the remaining
missing wages for those who never worked by simple imputation. Columns 5-7 report results based
on repeated imputation, having computed the reference median as in columns 2-4, respectively.
For all countries, and in particular for Ireland, France and Southern Europe, wage imputation
generates larger estimates of the median gender wage gap than in the benchmark sample of column
1. The estimates are of the same order of magnitude than the ones obtained when we assign a wage
below median to all missing wage observations or to all the unemployed individuals with missing
wages (see column 2 and 3 in Table 3). When we use simple imputation for the base sample (column
2) we cannot report estimated gaps for Spain and Greece because in both countries more than half
of the female sample would be assigned a wage below median. This is not the case for Italy,
diﬀerently from what we had in column 2 of Table 3 where, similarly to their Spanish and Greek
counterparts, more than 50% of Italian women were nonemployed, and hence the median wage gap
could not be reported. This may be explained by a non-negligible number of Italian women with
relatively high levels of educational and labor market experience, who are not observed in work at
the time of the survey. In other words, the probit model for determining the position of individuals
with respect to the median of the wage distribution seems to work somehow diﬀerently in Italy
from Spain and Greece.
We first compare the median wage gap obtained with simple imputation on the base sample
(column 2) with that obtained with simple imputation on the sample expanded with wage obser-
vations from adjacent waves (column 3). For all countries (except Belgium) the estimated median
wage gap on the expanded sample is lower than the one obtained for the base sample. This decline
is largest for Germany, the Netherlands, France, Ireland and Southern Europe. This is due to the
diﬀerence between the reference median wage in the two columns, and highlights the importance
16We use the STATA command bsqreg where we set the number of replications to 200.
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of estimating the median wage on a distribution that is as close as possible to the latent one. The
use of the expanded sample allows us to get a better estimate of the “true” median in the first step
of our procedure, thus generating more appropriate estimates of the median wage gap on the final,
imputed sample. A similar pattern is observed when we also use information on education and
work experience from other waves to recover missing data (column 4). The same discussion applies
to the results obtained using repeated imputation (comparing entries in column 5 with entries in
columns 6 and 7).
Second, we compare the results obtained with simple and repeated imputation. Repeated
imputation generates a lower estimate of the median gender gap for almost all countries. However,
this tendency is stronger for Ireland, France and Southern Europe (see columns 2 and 5). Simple
imputation tends to overestimate the gender wage gap when there is a relatively heavy mass of
women with a predicted probability of featuring below the median that is slightly lower than 0.5,
and this turns out to be the case for countries with high gender employment gaps. Moreover, with
repeated imputation we can obtain estimates of the wage gap for Spain and Greece, since we now
assign less than 50% of the female sample below the median.
Repeated imputation on the expanded sample should provide the most accurate estimate of the
median wage gap across countries. Comparing column 1 and column 7 we find that the median
wage gap on the imputed wage distribution increases slightly for the US, the UK, decreases slightly
in Scandinavia and the Netherlands, and stays roughly unchanged in most other central European
countries. However, estimated gender wage gaps on imputed distributions more than double in
Ireland, France and southern Europe. Specifically, the median wage gap in Spain, Portugal and
Greece is well above 20 log points, and reaches levels that are comparable to those observed for the
US and the UK both in the base and in the imputed samples.
Cross-country correlations between wage and employment gaps are reported in the bottom row
of Table 4. The underlying employment rates are now very close to 1 (see column 9 in Table 5),
as the only observations that remain out of the sample are the employed with genuinely missing
wages or those with missing information on human capital characteristics. While the correlation
on the base sample is negative and significant, they become not significantly diﬀerent from zero in
all samples obtained under simple and repeated imputation.
To broadly summarize our evidence, one could note that whether one corrects for selection on
unobservables (Table 2) or on observables (Table 3 and 4), our results are qualitatively consistent
in identifying a clear role of sample selection in Ireland, France and southern Europe.17 Quanti-
17We have performed a number of robustness tests and more disaggregate analyses on the results obtained and
reported in Tables 2 to 4. First, we have restricted the estimates to individuals aged 25-54 in 1999. The results
were very similar to those obtained on the larger sample. Second, for the imputation rules reported in Table 2
and 3, we have repeated our estimates separately for three education groups (less than upper secondary education,
upper secondary education, and higher education), and we found that most of the selection occurs across rather
than within groups, as median wage gaps disaggregated by education are much less aﬀected by sample inclusion
rules than in the aggregate. Finally, we have repeated our estimates separately for three demographic groups: single
individuals without kids in the household, married or cohabiting without kids, and married or cohabiting with kids.
We found evidence of a strong selection eﬀect in Ireland, France and southern Europe among those who are married
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tatively, the correction for sample selection is smallest when wage imputation is performed using
wage observation from adjacent waves, and increases when it is instead performed using observed
characteristics of the nonemployed. As argued above, this is mainly due to diﬀerent sizes of the
imputed samples. While only individuals with some degree of labor market attachment feature in
the imputed wage distribution in the first case, the use of observed characteristics may in principle
allow wage imputation for the whole population, thus including individuals with no labor market
attachment at all.
The fact that controlling for unobservables does not greatly change the picture obtained when
controlling for a small number of observables alone (education, experience and spouse income)
implies that most of the selection role can indeed be captured by a set of observable individual
characteristics, and possibly some unobservables closely correlated to them.
6 Adjusted wage gaps
6.1 Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions of wage gaps
Our discussion so far referred to unadjusted wage gaps. In other words, imputation was based on
whether an individual with certain education and experience characteristics should place below or
above the median, conditional on gender. While similar imputation methods could in principle
be used in estimating adjusted wage gaps, in practice one needs stronger assumptions in order
to establish whether a missing wage observation should be placed above or below the median.
For example, if the X vector contains, say, a gender dummy and human capital variables, then we
should need to assume that those with missing wage and a certain level of education and experience
place above or below the median, conditional on their gender and human capital levels. In order
to avoid making such stronger assumptions, when estimating adjusted wage gaps we only impute
wages based on wage observations in other waves in the sample, i.e. we correct for selection on
unobservables.
We report estimates obtained on two alternative samples: (i) those employed at the time of
survey in 1999 and (ii) those employed at least once in the sample period.18 Incidentally, when
applying the Oaxaca decomposition on the wage distribution enlarged with wage observation from
other waves in the panel, we are indeed exploiting information on the level of imputed wages, not
simply on their position with respect to the median, as we have done in the paper thus far.
We estimate separate wage equations for males and females, controlling in each for education
(less than upper secondary, upper secondary and higher education) experience (and its square),
broad occupation groups (12 categories for the US and 9 categories for Europe), industry (12
or cohabiting, especially when they have kids, and much less evidence of selection among single individuals without
kids.
18We do not report estimates for those employed at least once in a window of [-2,+2] years, as they do not provide
additional information from those based on those employed at least once in the sample period, nor we report estimates
corrected for real wage growth, as they do not diﬀer much from those at point (ii).
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categories for the US and 18 categories for Europe), public sector, and state or region dummies.
The resulting average gender wage gap can be thus decomposed according to the well known
Oaxaca (1973) decomposition into a component represented by gender diﬀerences in characteristics
and gender diﬀerences in the returns to characteristics:
wM − wF =
³
XM −XF
´ bβM +XF ³bβM − bβF´ (5)
where upper bars denote sample averages, hats denote OLS estimates and superscripts denote
gender.
We already know from Table 2 that extending the sample with wage imputation delivers a
substantially higher gender wage gap for some countries but not for others. The next set of results
are going to tell whether the impact of sample selection (if any) on the gender wage gap is going
to come mostly through characteristics or returns, i.e. whether in some countries women with
lower labor market attachment have a higher wage penalty with respect to men because they have
relatively poorer characteristics or they receive lower returns for a given set of characteristics.
The results of the Oaxaca decomposition are reported in Table 6. Belgium is excluded as the
relatively small sample size left us with several empty cells in the estimation of adjusted wage
gaps. The raw wage gaps reported in Table 6 are not necessarily the same as those of Table
2, because of slightly smaller sample size in Table 6, having dropped observations with missing
information on any of the right-hand side variables used. In all countries in the sample except the
US the contribution of diﬀerences in coeﬃcients is much more important than that of diﬀerences in
characteristics. While this could be in part due to the limited set of X-variables included, we also
estimated a specification that controlled for marital status and number of kids in age brackets 0-2,
3-5, 6-10, 11-15, and the split of the raw wage gap into characteristics’ and coeﬃcients’ components
was not greatly aﬀected with respect to figures reported in Table 6.
Another feature to be noticed is that the contribution of characteristics is actually negative in
southern Europe,19 meaning that working women in these countries have higher wage characteristics
than working men (and that diﬀerences between male and female coeﬃcients explain more than
100% of the observed wage gap). This is a consequence of very low female employment rates in these
countries, in the presence of selective participation into employment. One could also argue that it
could be a consequence of the limited set of explanatory variables used, but when we repeated the
same kind of Oaxaca decomposition having added marital status and number of dependent kids
by age category among the set of explanatory variables, we obtained very similar results to those
reported in Table 6.
As a comparison among the two panels of Table 6 shows, countries whose gender wage gap is not
seriously aﬀected by sample inclusion rules also have a roughly unchanged gap decomposition. In
countries where sample inclusion rules indeed aﬀect the estimated wage gap, it is both components
that matter, although the change in the characteristics component seems in general more important
19This is mostly the consequence of gender diﬀerences in average educational and occupational levels.
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than that in the returns component. In other words, in Ireland and southern Europe, women with
lower labor market attachment have a higher wage penalty with respect to men mostly because
they have relatively poorer characteristics than women with higher labor market attachment. This
seems to confirm the importance of selection along a small number of observable characteristics.
6.2 Employment selection versus overall wage dispersion
We have noticed in the previous sections that nonrandom selection into employment indeed matters
for our assessment of the gender wage gap in a set of countries where the gender employment gap is
relatively high. In particular, we showed that a number of corrections for sample selection explained
part of the international variation in gender wage gaps. To date, the existing literature has mostly
related such variation to international diﬀerences in overall wage inequality. Blau and Kahn (1996,
2003) argue that institutional diﬀerences across countries due, among other factors, to diﬀerent
degrees of unionization or diﬀerent sizes of public sectors may be responsible for diﬀerences in
overall levels of wage inequality. Higher wage inequality in turn translates into a higher gender
wage gap, given a certain degree of dissimilarity between the characteristics of working men and
women.
In order to compare the importance of sample selection versus overall inequality in explaining
cross-country diﬀerences in the gender wage gap, we analyze such diﬀerences using a method initially
proposed by Juhn et al. (1991) in order to study the slowdown in the convergence of black and
white wages in the US. Such method was first adapted to the study of cross-country diﬀerences in
the gender wage gap by Blau and Kahn (1996).20 It consists in decomposing the diﬀerence in the
gender wage gap between two countries into diﬀerences in observed and unobserved characteristics
of women compared to men, and diﬀerences in their respective returns.
To achieve this decomposition one estimates a male (log) wage equation for each country c:
wic = Xicβc + θicσc, (6)
where θic is the standardized male residual and σc is the standard deviation of male residuals, i.e.
a measure of male residual wage inequality. While Xic and θic denote characteristics, observed and
unobserved respectively, βc and σc denote the associated prices. The diﬀerence in the gender pay
gap between country A and country B can be thus decomposed into the following four terms:
DA −DB = (∆XA −∆XB)βA +∆XB(βA − βB) (7)
+(∆θA −∆θB)σA +∆θB(σA − σB),
where Dc ≡ wiA−wiB and ∆ represents the diﬀerence in male-female averages in Xic and θic. The
first term in (7) represents the contribution of country diﬀerences in gender diﬀerentials in observed
characteristics, all evaluated at the male coeﬃcients for country A (thus the reference country).
20See Blau and Kahn (1997, 2004) for an application to trends in the US gender wage gap.
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The second term reflects the eﬀect of diﬀerences in prices of such observed characteristics. The last
two terms represent the impact of diﬀerences in unexplained gaps. In particular, the third term
reflects country diﬀerences in gender diﬀerentials in unobserved characteristics. This is known as
the “gap eﬀect”, and measures the eﬀect of diﬀerences in the relative position of males and females
in the male residual wage distribution. It is a sort of black-box term, which is supposed to capture
the eﬀect of diﬀerences in women’s unmeasured characteristics with respect to men, but it is also
consistent with diﬀerences in the extent of pay discrimination against women. Finally, the fourth
term represents the impact of international diﬀerences in residual (male) wage inequality, given the
relative position of men and women in the residual distribution.
Computation of the first two terms is straightforward, simply based on sample averages of
included right-hand side variables and coeﬃcients from male regressions. The second and third
terms could be computed directly using the estimated values of σc, and then the sample averages
of ∆θc, exploiting the assumption of normal disturbances. However, such an assumption is not
necessary, and is typically not used in applications of the Juhn et al (1991) decomposition, if one
uses the entire distribution of estimated residuals. Specifically, the ∆θcσc are simply equal to minus
the average female residual, evaluated at male coeﬃcients (the average male coeﬃcient being zero).
For the ∆θBσA term one needs to compute what the mean country B female residuals would be if
the standard deviation of residuals were that of country A (again for men the mean is zero). Thus
we assign each woman in country B a percentile in the country B male residual distribution, based
on her residual. Then she is assigned the residual that corresponds to that percentile in country A.
This exercise is similar in spirit to the one performed in Tables 6 the Oaxaca (1973) decom-
position. However, the decomposition in (7) is based on the coeﬃcients obtained from male wage
regressions only, implicitly assuming that female coeﬃcients would be the same in the absence of
discrimination or misspecification due to non-random selection into work. In principle it has the
advantage of separately identifying the contribution of diﬀerences in overall wage inequality from
that of diﬀerences in characteristics (observed and unobserved) in the international variation in
gender wage gaps.
We implement decompositions as in (7) for pairs of countries in our sample. As the specification
used for the male wage equation has to be identical within each pair, we need to drop the US from
the sample, as the industry and occupation classification in the PSID does not exactly mirror
the one available in the ECHPS, plus the definition of experience is also somewhat diﬀerent. We
therefore take the UK as our reference country and perform bilateral comparisons between the UK
gender wage gap and that of each other EU country. In the notation of (7), country A is the UK.
The X vector includes controls for education, experience, occupation, sector, public sector, part
time work and temporary contract. Regional dummies are not included here, again for the need of
an identical wage equation specification across countries.
We perform once more our decompositions on two samples: the base 1999 sample and one en-
larged with imputed wage observations from all other waves. The results of the two decompositions
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are reported in Table 7. Estimates in the first panel are obtained on the base 1999 sample. The
first column is always positive, as it reports the diﬀerence in the wage gap between the UK and
that of each other country. Column 6 reports the contribution of the diﬀerences in both observable
(column 2) and unobservable (column 4) characteristics, while column 7 reports the contribution
of diﬀerences in the wage structure, in turn given by the sum of the contribution of diﬀerences in
observed (column 3) and unobserved (column 5) prices.
The wage structure component is everywhere positive, meaning that the UK has the most
unequal wage structure in our sample. Not surprisingly, this term is highest for Scandinavian coun-
tries. Wage structure diﬀerences by themselves would explain even more than the actual diﬀerence
in wage gaps DUK − Dc for all northern and central European countries (except Netherlands)
than the actual one. Hence, the characteristics component is negative, implying that the average
characteristics of working women relative to men are worse in these countries than in the UK.
A diﬀerent pattern emerges in Netherlands and southern European countries. There, the wage
structure component is also positive, but the diﬀerence with respect to the top set of countries is
that the characteristics component becomes positive, implying that the average characteristics of
working women relative to men are better in these countries than in the UK. This is not surprising
given the descriptive evidence of subsection 2.3 and the results presented in section 4.
Note however that this decomposition is not completely robust to the specific set of explanatory
variables used in the wage regression. In particular, when dummies for part time and temporary
work where not included, we found that the decomposition for the Netherlands became similar to
that of other northern European countries, i.e. the contribution of the characteristics component
became negative. Moreover, the contribution of characteristics in France and Ireland became
positive, although with much smaller magnitude than in southern Europe.
The second panel reports the same decomposition based on the sample that includes imputed
wage observations from other waves. The diﬀerence in raw wage gaps decreases mostly in central
and, even more, southern Europe. The characteristics component tends to fall in most countries,
with the exception of Scandinavia and Greece. This means that among those with weaker labor
market attachment the gender wage gap in characteristics is higher in most countries than in
the UK. Second, the wage structure component tends to fall in Scandinavia, France, Spain and
especially Greece (being roughly unaﬀected elsewhere). This means that returns to characteristics
among low-attached men in these countries tend to be lower than in the UK.
7 Conclusions
Gender wage gaps in the US and the UK are much higher than in other European countries, and
especially so with respect to Ireland, France and southern Europe. Although at first glance this
fact seem to suggest evidence of a more equal pay treatment across genders in the latter group of
countries, appearances can be deceptive.
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In this paper we note that gender wage gaps across countries are negatively correlated with
gender employment gaps, and illustrate the importance of non random selection into work in
understanding the observed international variation in gender wage gaps. To do this, we perform
wage imputation for those not in work, by simply making assumptions on the position of the imputed
wage observations with respect to the median. We then estimate median wage gaps on imputed
wage distributions, and assess the impact of selection into work by comparing estimated wage gaps
on the base sample with those obtained on a sample enlarged with wage imputation. Imputation is
performed according to diﬀerent methodologies based on unobservable or observable characteristics
of missing wage observations. With all imputation methods there is nothing that would tell a priori
which way correction for selection is going to aﬀect the results, as this is ultimately determined by
the wages that the nonemployed earned when they were previously (or later) employed, or by their
observable characteristics.
We find higher median wage gaps on imputed rather than actual wage distributions for most
countries in the sample, meaning that, as one would have expected, women tend on average to
be more positively selected into work than men. The only notable exceptions are Scandinavian
countries and the Netherlands where the wage gap in potential wages decreases slightly, if anything
providing evidence of an underlying selection mechanism of the opposite sign. In all other countries
the selection-corrected gender wage gap is higher than the uncorrected one. However, this diﬀerence
is small in the US, the UK and most central and northern European countries, and it is sizeable in
Ireland, France and southern Europe, i.e. countries in which the gender employment gap is highest.
Our (most conservative) estimates suggest that correction for employment selection explains about
60% of the observed negative correlation between wage and employment gaps. In particular, in
Spain, Portugal and Greece the median wage gap on the imputed wage distribution ranges between
20 and 30 log points across specifications. These are closely comparable levels to those of the US
and of other central and northern European countries.
Our analysis identifies a clear direction for future work. As we argue in this paper, gender
employment gaps are important in understanding cross-country diﬀerences in gender wage gaps.
Hence, one should ultimately assess the importance of demand and supply factor in explaining
variation in these gaps. As emphasized in recent work by Fernández and Fogli (2005) and by
Fortin (2005a and 2005b) ‘soft variables’ such as cultural beliefs about gender roles and family
values and individual attitudes towards greed, ambition and altruism are important determinants
of women’s employment decisions as well as of gender wage diﬀerentials. We believe that cross-
countries diﬀerences in these ’fuzzy’ variables, as well as diﬀerences in labor market and financial
institutions, might contribute to explain the cross-country patterns of women’s selection into the
labor force discussed in this paper and hence the international variation in gender pay gaps.
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Appendix. Rubin’s (1987) repeated imputation methodology
We are interested in estimating the median βˆ of the distribution of (log) wages w. However, part
of the wages are observed wobs and part of the wages are missing wmis. If wages where available
for everyone in the sample we would have βˆ = βˆ (wobs, wmis) , our statistic of interest. In the
absence of wmis suppose that we have a series of m > 1 repeated imputations of the missing
wages, w1mis, ..., wmmis. From this expanded data set we can calculate the imputed-data estimates
of the median of the wage distribution βˆc = βˆ
¡
wobs, wcmis
¢
as well as their estimated variances
U c = U
¡
wobs, wcmis
¢
for each round of imputation c = 1, ..,m. The overall estimate of β is simply
the average of the m estimates so obtained, that is: β¯ = 1m
Pm
c=1 βˆ
c. The estimated variance for
β¯ is given by T = (1 + 1m)B + U¯ where B =
?m
c=1(βˆ
c−β¯)2
(m−1) is the between-imputation variance and
U¯ = 1m
Pm
c=1 U c is the within-imputation variance. Test and confidence interval for the statistics
are based on a Student’s t-approximation (β¯−β)/
√
T with degrees of freedom given by the formula:
(m− 1)
h
1 + U¯
(1+ 1m )B
i2
. As discussed in Rubin (1987) with a 50% missing observations, an estimate
based on 5 repeated imputation has a standard deviation that is only about 5% wider than one
based on an infinite number of repeated imputations. Since in some of our countries we have more
than 50% missing observations we use m = 20 in our repeated imputation methodology.21 Note
21This choice is quiet conservative. Schafer (1999) suggests that there is little benefit to choose m bigger than 10.
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that this methodology requires that
³
βˆ − β
´
/
√
U follows a standard Normal distribution. That is,
βˆ is a consistent estimator of β with a limiting Normal distribution. The LAD estimation property
that we discussed above ensure that this is the case.
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Figure 1: Gender gaps in median hourly wages and in employment, 1994-2001 
Table 1 
Raw (mean) wage and employment gaps, 1994-2001 
Aged 16-64 
 
 
  Wage gaps Employment gaps 
 by highest qualification by highest qualification 
Country       Total Low Medium High Total Low Medium High
US 30.2        29.6 31.0 39.4 12.6 22.1 13.8 9.2
UK         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
27.0 24.5 22.2 25.0 11.8 12.2 10.2 8.5
Finland 17.8 17.7 17.5 27.8 6.9 5.8 8.7 8.1
Denmark 10.8 8.0 10.1 16.8 7.8 17.5 6.7 3.0
Germany 23.8 15.5 21.4 25.3 18.4 23.2 17.5 8.5
Netherlands 24.2 23.7 23.5 27.7 23.1 23.2 26.0 12.5
Belgium 12.1 20.1 14.3 15.4 23.2 38.7 26.8 6.7
Austria 22.3 10.4 23.5 26.3 28.9 39.6 24.3 10.5
Ireland 15.1 29.4 15.9 10.4 30.5 36.6 29.8 13.6
France 14.3 17.8 15.7 17.9 24.2 32.3 21.5 11.6
Italy 6.3 15.9 5.6 9.5 38.1 49.8 24.7 14.1
Spain 13.4 24.2 21.2 15.0 36.8 43.8 29.0 16.9
Portugal 9.8 22.7 15.8 8.0 28.6 34.7 9.0 2.0
Greece 12.0 20.9 18.2 12.6 48.2 58.8 42.4 22.1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
1. The sample includes individuals aged 16-64, excluding the self-employed, the military and those in full-time education. 
2. Definitions. Low qualification: less than upper secondary education. Medium qualification: upper secondary education. High qualification: higher education. 
3. Source: PSID (1994-2001) and ECHPS (1994-2001).  
Table 1A 
Raw (mean) wage and employment gaps, 1994-2001 
Aged 25-54 
 
 
  Wage gaps Employment gaps 
 by highest qualification by highest qualification 
Country   Total Low Medium High Total Low Medium High
US 31.7        30.9 30.6 35.9 13.4 27.31 14.22 10.16
UK         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
30.5 30.4 26.8 24.0 13.5 13.8 12.2 9.5
Finland 18.4 19.7 17.6 27.0 7.5 4.4 10.1 8.8
Denmark 11.2 12.1 9.6 15.6 7.1 17.4 6.6 2.9
Germany 24.0 28.3 20.3 23.9 18.5 25.1 17.7 9.4
Netherlands 23.9 24.0 22.6 27.0 24.5 24.6 28.1 13.8
Belgium 10.9 20.0 13.7 13.4 20.8 36.3 26.1 6.4
Austria 22.5 25.8 20.9 25.1 26.8 35.7 24.1 11.5
Ireland 17.9 35.2 19.5 5.1 28.9 32.9 31.2 13.2
France 14.2 19.1 15.7 16.9 22.6 29.9 21.7 11.3
Italy 5.7 16.5 5.0 7.1 37.9 51.1 26.4 13.9
Spain 11.6 23.1 21.1 12.4 37.9 46.9 32.5 17.3
Portugal 11.8 26.4 15.4 6.1 26.5 33.0 9.2 2.2
Greece 9.6 21.6 15.3 7.2 46.5 58.6 44.6 20.6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
1. The sample includes individuals aged 25-54, excluding the self-employed, the military and those in full-time education. 
2. Definitions. Low qualification: less than upper secondary education. Medium qualification: upper secondary education. High qualification: higher education. 
3. Source: PSID (1994-2001) and ECHPS (1994-2001). 
 
Table 2 
Raw (median) wage gaps, 1999, under alternative sample inclusion rules 
Wage imputation based on wage observations from adjacent waves 
 
      1 2 3 4 5
US      0.339 0.359 0.371 0.361 0.374
UK      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
0.255 0.252 0.259 0.271 0.276
Finland 0.169 0.149 0.149 0.158 0.158
Denmark 0.119 0.095 0.095 0.086 0.086
Germany 0.220 0.236 0.232 0.247 0.244
Netherlands 0.245 0.215 0.220 0.218 0.225
Belgium 0.128 0.106 0.115 0.105 0.115
Austria 0.223 0.239 0.238 0.235 0.235
Ireland 0.157 0.256 0.260 0.272 0.279
France 0.124 0.144 0.158 0.152 0.168
Italy 0.067 0.060 0.073 0.070 0.081
Spain 0.120 0.170 0.184 0.161 0.171
Portugal 0.088 0.175 0.180 0.183 0.200
Greece 0.107 0.194 0.212 0.197 0.196
Correlation -0.455* -0.227 -0.181 -0.232 -0.231
 
Notes. All wage gaps are significant at the 1% level. Figures in the last row display the cross-country correlation between the gender wage gap and the corresponding gender 
employment gap after imputation (* denotes significance at the 10% level). Sample: aged 16-64, excluding the self-employed, the military and those in full-time education. Source: 
PSID and ECHPS.  
 
Sample inclusion rules by columns: 
1. Employed at time of survey in 1999 
2. Wage imputed from other waves when nonemployed (-2,+2 window) 
3. Wage imputed from other waves when nonemployed (-5,+2 window) 
4. Wage imputed from other waves when nonemployed (-5,+2 window), adjusted for real wage growth by gender and country. 
5. Wage imputed from other waves when nonemployed (-5,+2 window), adjusted for real wage growth by gender and country. 
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Panel A: Unadjusted gender gaps. Correlation: 0.455* 
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Panel B: Selection adjusted gender gaps. Correlation: 0.181. 
 
Figure 2: Gender gaps in median hourly wages and employment, 1999. 
Table 3 
Raw (median) wage gaps, 1999, under alternative imputation rules 
Wage imputation based on observables – Educated guesses 
 
 1      2 3 4 5 6
 Wage 
gap 
Wage 
gap 
Goodness 
imputation 
Wage 
gap 
Goodness 
imputation 
Wage 
gap 
Goodness 
imputation 
Wage 
gap 
Goodness 
imputation 
Wage 
gap 
           
               
M F M F M F M F
US 0.339 0.455 0.81 0.71 0.340 1.00 0.90 0.350 0.70 0.78 0.355 0.63 0.86 0.376
UK               
               
               
               
               
              
               
               
               
            
               
               
            
            
0.255 0.354 0.77 0.59 0.221 0.80 0.78 0.214 0.52 0.46 0.248 0.78 0.76 0.249
Finland 0.169 0.163 0.78 0.71 0.120 0.78 0.81 0.126 0.50 0.44 0.147 0.88 0.78 0.149
Denmark 0.119 0.105 0.67 0.75 0.078 0.73 0.75 0.079 0.88 0.59 0.100 0.88 0.63 0.095
Germany 0.220 0.403 0.72 0.47 0.239 0.74 0.67 0.218 0.64 0.65 0.241 0.67 0.77 0.232
Netherlands
 
0.245 0.422 0.45 0.43 0.257 0.65 0.59 0.202 0.75 0.69 0.216 0.45 0.73 0.217
Belgium 0.128 0.267 0.72 0.66 0.143 0.79 0.75 0.085 0.70 0.50 0.111 0.70 0.94 0.108
Austria 0.223 0.438 0.71 0.48 0.222 0.71 0.74 0.213 1.00 0.76 0.250 0.73 0.75 0.239
Ireland 0.157 0.718 0.82 0.18 0.217 0.86 0.71 0.217 0.84 0.74 0.267 0.70 0.91 0.254
France
 
0.124 0.442
 
0.76 0.38
 
0.140 0.81 0.81 0.073 0.54 0.59 0.123 0.75 0.90 0.145
Italy 0.067 - 0.69 - 0.115 0.73 0.66 0.063 0.92 0.77 0.141 0.70 0.87 0.075
Spain 0.120 - 0.59 - 0.205 0.74 0.60 0.103 0.77 0.68 0.159 0.52 0.90 0.170
Portugal
 
0.088 0.377
 
0.59 0.43
 
0.182 0.59 0.63 0.178 0.81 0.74 0.187 0.63 0.55 0.194
Greece 0.107 - 0.75 - 0.240 0.75
 
0.66
 
0.174 0.68 0.79 0.281 0.73
 
0.61 0.239
Correlation -0.455* -0.001 0.074 -0.133 0.131 -0.133
 
Notes. All wage gaps are significant at the 1% level. In specification 2 no results are reported for Italy, Spain and Greece as more than 50% of women in the sample are 
nonemployed. Figures in the last row display the cross-country correlation between the gender wage gap and the corresponding gender employment gap after imputation (* denotes 
significance at the 10% level). Sample: aged 16-64, excluding the self-employed, the military and those in full-time education. Source: PSID and ECHPS.  
 
Sample inclusion rules by columns: 
1. Employed at time of survey in 1999; 
2. Impute wage<median(wage|gender) when nonemployed; 
3. Impute wage<median(wage|gender) when nonemployed and & individual is unemployed; 
4. Impute wage<median(wage|gender) when nonemployed & education<upper secondary & experience<10 years;                      Impute 
wage>median(wage|gender) when nonemployed & education >=higher ed. & experience>=10 years; 
5. Impute wage<median(wage|gender) when nonemployed & spouse income in bottom quartile;                                           
6. Wage imputed from other waves when nonemployed (-5,+2 window) and (4). 
Table 4 
Raw (median) wage gaps in sample, 1999, under alternative imputation rules 
Wage imputation based on observables – Probabilistic model 
 
 Base sample Simple imputation Repeated imputation 
1 2  3 4 5  6 7
US        0.339 0.450 0.423 0.425 0.404 0.399 0.401
UK        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
      
0.255 0.341 0.306 0.314 0.298 0.292 0.291
Finland 0.169 0.196 0.162 0.161 0.167 0.154 0.153
Denmark 0.119 0.103 0.095 0.097 0.101 0.095 0.094
Germany 0.220 0.431 0.293 0.305 0.278 0.250 0.249
Netherlands 0.245 0.425 0.312 0.285 0.273 0.265 0.235
Belgium 0.128 0.180 0.214 0.217 0.160 0.165 0.162
Austria 0.223 0.335 0.306 0.314 0.269 0.277 0.275
Ireland 0.157 0.580 0.412 0.443 0.385 0.346 0.347
France 0.124 0.350 0.285 0.305 0.196 0.213 0.195
Italy 0.067 0.372 0.253 0.270 0.216 0.191 0.141
Spain 0.120 - 0.521 0.540 0.362 0.321 0.284
Portugal 0.088 0.400 0.322 0.357 0.280 0.244 0.233
Greece 0.107 - 0.651 0.550 0.564 0.465 0.368
Correlation -0.455* 0.119 -0.06 -0.048 0.090 0.011 0.056
    
 
Notes. All wage gaps are significant at the 1% level. In specification 2 no results are reported for Spain and Greece as more than 50% of women in the sample have a predicted 
probability of having below-median wages higher that 0.5. Figures in the last row display the cross-country correlation between the gender wage gap and the corresponding gender 
employment gap after imputation (* denotes significance at the 10% level). Sample: aged 16-64, excluding the self-employed, the military and those in fulltime education. Source: 
PSID and ECHPS.   
 
Sample inclusion rules by columns, X includes two education dummies (upper secondary, more than upper secondary), experience and its square: 
1. Employed at time of survey in 1999; 
2. Impute wage >(<) median if nonemployed and .  is the predicted probability of having a wage above the base sample median, as estimated from a probit 
model including a gender dummy, two education dummies, experience and its square. 
5.0)(ˆ <> ˆ
5.0)(ˆ <>iP iPˆ
3. Impute wage >(<) median if nonemployed and .  as above, having enlarged the base sample with wage observation from adjacent waves. 
5.0)(ˆ <> ˆ iP iP4. Impute wage >(<) median if .  as above, having enlarged the base sample with wage observation from adjacent waves and their observed characteristics. 
ˆi
P
iPˆ
iP
5. Impute wage > median with probability  if nonemployed. Repeated imputation with 20 repeated samples.  is the predicted probability of having a wage above the base 
sample median, as estimated from a probit model including a gender dummy, two education dummies, experience and its square. 
ˆ ˆ
iP
6. Impute wage > median with probability  if nonemployed. Repeated imputation with 20 repeated samples.  as above, having enlarged the base sample with wage 
observation from adjacent waves. 
iP iP
7. Impute wage > median with probability  if nonemployed. Repeated imputation with 20 repeated samples.  as above, having enlarged the base sample with wage 
observation from adjacent waves and their observed characteristics. 
iPˆ iPˆ
 
 
Table 5 
Percentage of adult population in samples for Tables 2 to 4: 
 
 No. obs.  
in 1999 
1 (%)    2 (%) 3 (%) 4 (%) 5(%) 6(%) 7(%) 8 (%) 9 (%) 
                    
        
M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F
US 3386 4301 94.8 81.8 97.4 90.0 97.7 91.2 100.0 100.0 95.3 82.6 96.2 87.9 96.1 85.8 97.9 92.8 99.8 99.6
UK        
         
         
         
         
        
        
         
         
        
         
         
        
2694 3293 84.6 74.2 90.8 84.1 91.9 86.9 96.7 97.1 89.5 76.4 88.7 82.0 87.6 77.0 94.2 90.4 98.9 98.7
Finland 1886 2154 89.2 80.4 94.4 90.6 95.0 91.3 99.0 98.5 98.3 90.8 90.3 84.3 90.1 81.4 95.6 93.1 99.7 99.3
Denmark 1282 1338 93.1 86.5 98.8 95.1 99.0 95.9 98.0 98.1 97.0 92.6 94.0 89.2 93.8 87.5 99.2 96.6 99.8 99.5
Germany 3743 4034 88.2 67.4 95.8 81.0 97.7 85.1 98.5 94.0 96.8 75.0 89.8 70.3 90.4 68.7 98.0 86.2 99.4 96.6
Netherlands
 
2990 3476 87.1 64.7 91.5 75.2 93.2 78.0 99.7 99.2 90.2 75.1 88.4 69.6 92.0 69.2 93.6 79.4 99.6 99.5
Belgium
 
1364 1634 88.0 65.9 92.2 73.3 93.2 76.7 98.8 98.3 94.9 76.9 89.8 70.6 91.6 71.8 94.2 79.8 99.0 98.3
Austria 1756 1881 94.6 65.3 98.1 73.9 98.4 76.4 99.7 97.9 99.0 68.8 95.2 67.0 95.4 67.9 98.6 77.1 99.8 94.2
Ireland 1586 1979 84.2 55.1 89.7 66.3 90.6 69.1 99.6 99.1 92.6 58.6 85.8 58.8 87.8 60.7 91.0 71.5 99.9 99.1
France
 
3067 3557 71.2 52.1 90.8 71.3 92.5 75.6 86.2 90.8 79.0 62.5 74.9 59.0 73.4 53.6 93.9 79.0 98.4 98.2
Italy 3952 4903 74.7 40.3 86.7 49.5 87.9 52.2 94.9 97.2 91.2 52.8 77.7 44.9 77.3 49.2 89.4 55.1 98.3 96.9
Spain 3648 4289 78.0 40.7 88.1 53.7 90.0 56.9 99.6 99.6 90.5 51.8 81.7 48.7 83.0 42.1 91.5 61.4 99.6 99.4
Portugal
 
2916 3294 88.4 61.6 94.0 70.6 95.0 73.3 99.3 98.8 93.9 68.7 89.9 66.2 90.4 66.2 95.3 75.1 99.3 98.8
Greece 1812 2746 81.8 32.7 90.6 43.0 91.4 45.7 99.8 99.3 93.7 43.2 84.9 40.3 83.9 41.3 92.6 50.9 99.1 98.4
 
Notes. Sample: aged 16-64, excluding the self-employed, the military and those in full-time education. Sweden is excluded as no wage information is available in any wave; 
Luxembourg is excluded as no wage information is available after wave 3. Source: PSID and ECHPS.  
Sample inclusion rules by column:  
1. Employed at time of survey in 1999; 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Wage imputed from other waves when nonemployed (-2,+2 window); 
Wage imputed from other waves when nonemployed (-5,+2 window); 
Impute wage<median when nonemployed; 
Impute wage<median when unemployed; 
Impute wage<median when nonemployed & education<upper secondary & experience<10 years; Impute wage>median when nonemployed & education>=higher ed. & 
experience>=10; 
Impute wage<median when nonemployed & spouse income in bottom quartile; 
(3) and (6); 
(3) and wage imputed using probabilistic model (see notes to Table 4). 
 
Table 6 
Adjusted wage gaps, 1999, decompositions at the mean 
Under alternative sample inclusion rules 
 
 
 
 
Employed in 1999 
at time of survey 
Wage imputed from other waves when  
missing 
raw chars. coefs. sample raw chars. coefs. sample
M F M F
USA           0.302 0.118 0.184 2808 2872 0.303 0.119 0.184 2860 3027
UK           0.245 0.092 0.153 2120 2131 0.247 0.094 0.152 2295 2430
Finland           0.161 0.039 0.121 941 922 0.174 0.074 0.101 1026 1098
Denmark           0.118 0.034 0.084 716 711 0.134 0.039 0.095 775 803
Germany           0.217 0.072 0.144 2669 2037 0.218 0.071 0.146 2971 2531
Netherlands           0.202 0.050 0.152 2472 1805 0.213 0.057 0.157 2617 2018
Austria 0.225          0.067 0.158 1624 1159 0.249 0.075 0.175 1685 1309
Ireland           0.148 0.025 0.124 1135 860 0.179 0.045 0.134 1216 1041
France           0.108 0.044 0.064 2031 1731 0.155 0.060 0.095 2631 2462
Italy 0.063          -0.056 0.118 2719 1824 0.082 -0.041 0.124 3160 2279
Spain           0.124 -0.010 0.134 2725 1631 0.188 0.036 0.151 3133 2175
Portugal           0.086 -0.051 0.137 2443 1904 0.125 -0.017 0.141 2617 2224
Greece           0.088 -0.015 0.103 1391 851 0.160 0.056 0.104 1539 1161
     
         
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Notes.  
1. Characteristics included are: regional or state dummies, education dummies, experience and its square, 12 occupation dummies for the US and 8 for the EU, 12 industry 
dummies for the US and 18 for the EU. 
2. Sample: aged 16-64, excluding the self-employed, the military and those in full-time education. Belgium is excluded due to small sample size. Source: PSID and ECHPS.  
Table 7 
JMP (1991) decomposition of the difference between the gender wage gap in the UK and in each other EU country 
 
          1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
DUK-Dc Observed
characteristics
Observed 
prices 
Gap 
effect 
Unobserved 
prices 
Total 
charact.
Wage 
structure
No. obs 
males 
No. obs 
females 
Employed in 1999 at time of survey 
Finland       0.092 0.027 0.044   -0.085 0.106 -0.058 0.150 932 900
Denmark          
          
          
         
          
          
         
          
          
          
0.127 -0.036 0.057 -0.011 0.116 -0.047 0.173 700 697
Germany 0.031 0.024 0.025 -0.123 0.106 -0.099 0.131 2521 1904
Netherlands
 
0.050 0.022 -0.096 0.023 0.101 0.045 0.005 2424 1761
Austria 0.012 0.027 -0.023 -0.102 0.109 -0.075 0.086 1541 1103
Ireland 0.064 0.028 -0.015 -0.044 0.095 -0.016 0.080 1203 934
France
 
0.117 -0.005 0.024 -0.005 0.103 -0.010 0.127 1937 1654
Italy 0.192 0.111 0.035 -0.057 0.104 0.054 0.139 2663 1759
Spain 0.120 0.108 0.000 -0.081 0.092 0.027 0.092 2728 1633
Portugal 0.157 0.131 0.031 -0.097 0.092 0.034 0.123 2509 1951
Greece 0.151 0.110 -0.003 -0.050 0.094 0.060 0.091 1396 852
Wage imputed from other waves when missing 
Finland      0.087 0.009    0.03 -0.060 0.108 -0.051 0.138 1011 1058
Denmark          
          
          
         
          
          
        
        
          
          
0.120 0.060 0.017 -0.071 0.114 -0.011 0.131 752 764
Germany 0.021 0.023 0.027 -0.135 0.107 -0.112 0.134 2776 2336
Netherlands
 
0.037 0.037 -0.088 -0.014 0.102 0.023 0.014 2542 1961
Austria -0.012 0.010 -0.020 -0.110 0.107 -0.100 0.087 1601 1248
Ireland 0.040 0.017 -0.023 -0.049 0.095 -0.032 0.072 1273 1095
France 0.073 0.027 -0.008 -0.051
 
0.105 -0.024 0.097 2500 2335
Italy 0.173 0.112 0.029 -0.07 0.103 0.042 0.132 3044 2157
Spain 0.062 0.106 -0.037 -0.102 0.095 0.004 0.058 3111 2141
Portugal 0.126 0.124 0.024 -0.115 0.092 0.009 0.116 2648 2203
Greece 0.085 0.121 -0.070 -0.057 0.091 0.064 0.021 1546 1135
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes.  
1. The decomposition is based on an identical male wage equation across countries, including education dummies, experience and its square, 12 occupation dummies and 18 
industry dummies. 
2. Sample: aged 16-64, employed in 1999, excluding the self-employed, the military and those in full-time education. The US is excluded as slight data differences did not 
allowed for an identical specification of the wage equation to that of other countries; Belgium is excluded due to small sample size. Source: ECHPS.  
3. (6)=(2)+(4); (7)=(3)+(5). 
 
 
 Table A1: Descriptive statistics of samples used 
 
 US  UK Finland 
 Males Females
 
   
               
Males Females
 
Males Females
  Obs Mean Std Obs Mean Std Obs Mean Std Obs Mean Std Obs Mean Std Obs Mean Std
Employed 3386                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
0.949 0.220 4301 0.819 0.385 2694 0.878 0.327 3293 0.771 0.420 1886 0.902 0.298 2154 0.818 0.386
Unemployed 3386 0.014 0.064 4301 0.017 0.085 2694 0.049 0.216 3293 0.021 0.144 1886 0.091 0.288 2154 0.104 0.305
Inactive 3386 0.047 0.212 4301 0.174 0.379 2694 0.073 0.260 3293 0.208 0.406 1886 0.007 0.083 2154 0.078 0.267
Log(hourly wage) 3213 2.760 0.703 3521 2.440 0.660 2278 3.493 0.512 2445 3.238 0.507 1682 5.645 0.477 1731 5.476 0.397
Age 3386 39.702 10.430 4301 39.050 10.439 2694 37.944 12.168 3293 38.112 11.935 1886 39.510 11.450 2154 40.388 11.302
Educ 1 3253 0.166 0.372 4058 0.170 0.376 2694 0.290 0.454 3293 0.331 0.471 1886 0.206 0.405 2154 0.199 0.399
Educ 2 3253 0.576 0.494 4058 0.593 0.491 2694 0.075 0.264 3293 0.106 0.307 1886 0.479 0.500 2154 0.380 0.485
Educ 3 3253 0.258 0.437 4058 0.237 0.425 2694 0.634 0.482 3293 0.563 0.496 1886 0.315 0.465 2154 0.421 0.494
Experience 3279 20.995 18.295 4196 15.493 16.108 2694 20.115 14.004 3293 21.826 14.030 1886 21.190 12.604 2154 21.704 12.131
Married 3386 0.771 0.421 4301 0.652 0.476 2693 0.701 0.458 3292 0.723 0.448 1886 0.753 0.431 2154 0.799 0.401
No. Kids 0-2 3386 0.162 0.423 4301 0.182 0.452 2694 0.109 0.338 3293 0.127 0.367 1886 0.137 0.399 2154 0.143 0.404
No. Kids 3-5 3386 0.175 0.423 4301 0.205 0.468 2694 0.112 0.349 3293 0.135 0.380 1886 0.135 0.375 2154 0.143 0.387
No. Kids 6-10 3386 0.305 0.614 4301 0.344 0.641 2694 0.189 0.495 3293 0.232 0.533 1886 0.238 0.559 2154 0.267 0.585
No. Kids 11-15 3386 0.307 0.626 4301 0.349 0.654 2694 0.187 0.492 3293 0.219 0.524 1886 0.221 0.519 2154 0.244 0.533
Spouse 1st quartile 3386 0.208 0.406 4301 0.166 0.373 2601 0.099 0.298 2971 0.071 0.257 1836 0.064 0.245 2064 0.065 0.247
Spouse 2nd quartile 3386 0.200 0.400 4301 0.156 0.363 2601 0.109 0.311 2971 0.120 0.325 1836 0.143 0.350 2064 0.137 0.344
Spouse 3rd quartile 3386 0.200 0.400 4301 0.156 0.363 2601 0.220 0.414 2971 0.247 0.432 1836 0.261 0.439 2064 0.260 0.439
Spouse 4th quartile 3386 0.153 0.360 4301 0.154 0.361 2601 0.263 0.441 2971 0.254 0.436 1836 0.278 0.448 2064 0.328 0.470
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table A1 (continued): Descriptive statistics on samples used 
 
 Denmark   Germany Netherlands
 Males Females
 
   
               
Males Females
 
Males Females
  Obs Mean Std Obs Mean Std Obs Mean Std Obs Mean Std Obs Mean Std Obs Mean Std
Employed 1282                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
 0.777                 
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
0.950 0.218 1338 0.884 0.320 3743 0.897 0.303 4034 0.733 0.442 2990 0.874 0.332 3476 0.655 0.476
Unemployed 1281 0.039 0.194 1338 0.061 0.239 3732 0.085 0.280 3987 0.076 0.265 2971 0.031 0.174 3413 0.106 0.308
Inactive 1282 0.010 0.100 1338 0.055 0.229 3743 0.017 0.130 4034 0.191 0.393 2990 0.095 0.293 3476 0.240 0.427
Log(hourly wage) 1194 6.308 0.425 1158 6.190 0.351 3303 4.497 0.608 2720 4.277 0.573 2604 4.886 0.497 2250 4.641 0.520
Age 1282 39.869 11.362 1338 39.851 11.270 3743 38.990 11.765 4034 38.969 11.640 2990 42.010 11.256 3476 41.658 11.254
Educ 1 1282 0.170 0.376 1338 0.173 0.378 3743 0.213 0.410 4034 0.249 0.433 2990 0.886 0.318 3476 0.818 0.386
Educ 2 1282 0.537 0.499 1338 0.531 0.499 3743 0.566 0.496 4034 0.590 0.492 2990 0.040 0.196 3476 0.067 0.251
Educ 3 1282 0.293 0.455 1338 0.297 0.457 3743 0.220 0.414 4034 0.161 0.367 2990 0.074 0.261 3476 0.115 0.319
Experience 1282 22.259 12.340 1338 21.880 12.330 3743 23.262 13.530 4034 23.093 13.263 2990 24.538 14.245 3476 24.975 17.309
Married 1280 0.416 1335 0.801 0.399 3743 0.737 0.440 4034 0.782 0.413 2990 0.813 0.390 3476 0.806 0.396
No. Kids 0-2 1282 0.148 0.395 1338 0.158 0.404 3743 0.084 0.289 4034 0.091 0.302 2990 0.100 0.324 3476 0.098 0.320
No. Kids 3-5 1282 0.141 0.385 1338 0.153 0.394 3743 0.111 0.342 4034 0.117 0.351 2990 0.130 0.374 3476 0.127 0.369
No. Kids 6-10 1282 0.218 0.509 1338 0.251 0.534 3743 0.190 0.472 4034 0.204 0.489 2990 0.234 0.557 3476 0.239 0.563
No. Kids 11-15 1282 0.197 0.489 1338 0.231 0.516 3743 0.203 0.485 4034 0.217 0.494 2990 0.238 0.557 3476 0.250 0.569
Spouse 1st quartile 1245 0.076 0.266 1274 0.057 0.233 3584 0.159 0.366 3830 0.075 0.264 2827 0.227 0.419 3151 0.101 0.301
Spouse 2nd quartile 1245 0.129 0.336 1274 0.174 0.379 3584 0.067 0.250 3830 0.143 0.350 2827 0.080 0.271 3151 0.105 0.306
Spouse 3rd quartile 1245 0.261 0.439 1274 0.265 0.442 3584 0.256 0.437 3830 0.293 0.455 2827 0.252 0.434 3151 0.264 0.441
Spouse 4th quartile 1245 0.304 0.460 1274 0.295 0.456 3584 0.243 0.429 3830 0.259 0.438 2827 0.245 0.430 3151 0.315 0.465
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table A1 (continued): Descriptive statistics on samples used 
 
 Belgium   Austria Ireland
 Males Females
 
   
               
Males Females
 
Males Females
  Obs Mean Std Obs Mean Std Obs Mean Std Obs Mean Std Obs Mean Std Obs Mean Std
Employed 1364                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
0.892 0.310 1634 0.674 0.469 1756 0.949 0.219 1881 0.674 0.469 1586 0.846 0.362 1979 0.559 0.497
Unemployed 1363 0.068 0.252 1632 0.111 0.314 1756 0.044 0.205 1878 0.035 0.183 1586 0.084 0.277 1978 0.035 0.185
Inactive 1364 0.039 0.193 1634 0.214 0.410 1756 0.007 0.082 1881 0.291 0.454 1586 0.071 0.256 1979 0.405 0.491
Log(hourly wage) 1201 7.649 0.410 1076 7.521 0.399 1662 6.343 0.494 1229 6.120 0.493 1335 3.462 0.584 1090 3.304 0.547
Age 1364 40.695 10.083 1634 40.110 10.343 1756 36.695 11.829 1881 38.969 12.405 1586 37.176 12.745 1979 40.007 13.081
Educ 1 1364 0.268 0.443 1634 0.277 0.447 1756 0.233 0.423 1881 0.350 0.477 1586 0.412 0.492 1979 0.424 0.494
Educ 2 1364 0.359 0.480 1634 0.342 0.475 1756 0.701 0.458 1881 0.577 0.494 1586 0.390 0.488 1979 0.397 0.489
Educ 3 1364 0.374 0.484 1634 0.381 0.486 1756 0.065 0.247 1881 0.073 0.260 1586 0.197 0.398 1979 0.179 0.384
Experience 1364 21.975 12.630 1634 22.022 14.288 1756 21.478 12.045 1881 24.590 14.983 1586 20.327 14.009 1979 23.178 14.739
Married 1359 0.796 0.403 1632 0.770 0.421 1756 0.630 0.483 1880 0.710 0.454 1586 0.551 0.498 1979 0.654 0.476
No. Kids 0-2 1364 0.116 0.334 1634 0.119 0.341 1756 0.087 0.307 1881 0.114 0.358 1586 0.083 0.292 1979 0.116 0.343
No. Kids 3-5 1364 0.133 0.369 1634 0.138 0.379 1756 0.104 0.332 1881 0.113 0.344 1586 0.099 0.329 1979 0.132 0.377
No. Kids 6-10 1364 0.303 0.632 1634 0.302 0.615 1756 0.191 0.476 1881 0.214 0.500 1586 0.247 0.574 1979 0.290 0.605
No. Kids 11-15 1364 0.260 0.555 1634 0.267 0.568 1756 0.206 0.505 1881 0.221 0.516 1586 0.284 0.612 1979 0.317 0.636
Spouse 1st quartile 1328 0.172 0.378 1564 0.083 0.276 1714 0.131 0.337 1834 0.093 0.290 1558 0.177 0.382 1940 0.080 0.272
Spouse 2nd quartile 1328 0.032 0.175 1564 0.104 0.306 1714 0.092 0.289 1834 0.129 0.335 1558 0.033 0.178 1940 0.101 0.301
Spouse 3rd quartile 1328 0.227 0.419 1564 0.279 0.449 1714 0.202 0.402 1834 0.221 0.415 1558 0.158 0.365 1940 0.190 0.393
Spouse 4th quartile 1328 0.361 0.480 1564 0.293 0.455 1714 0.197 0.398 1834 0.260 0.439 1558 0.175 0.380 1940 0.275 0.447
 
 
 
 
 
 Table A1 (continued): Descriptive statistics on samples used 
 
 France   Italy Spain
 Males Females
 
   
               
Males Females
 
Males Females
  Obs Mean Std Obs Mean Std Obs Mean Std Obs Mean Std Obs Mean Std Obs Mean Std
Employed 3067                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
0.850 0.357 3557 0.613 0.487 3952 0.798 0.401 4903 0.430 0.495 3648 0.784 0.411 4289 0.411 0.492
Unemployed 3063 0.079 0.269 3554 0.104 0.305 3949 0.165 0.371 4902 0.126 0.332 3648 0.125 0.331 4289 0.111 0.314
Inactive 3067 0.072 0.258 3557 0.283 0.450 3952 0.037 0.189 4903 0.444 0.497 3648 0.090 0.287 4289 0.478 0.500
Log(hourly wage) 2183 5.653 0.519 1853 5.529 0.519 2953 4.190 0.407 1975 4.123 0.418 2846 8.412 0.511 1746 8.293 0.548
Age 3067 38.898 10.731 3557 40.091 11.206 3952 37.430 11.258 4903 39.657 11.874 3648 38.210 12.100 4289 40.304 12.651
Educ 1 3067 0.646 0.478 3557 0.616 0.487 3952 0.487 0.500 4903 0.527 0.499 3648 0.561 0.496 4289 0.604 0.489
Educ 2 3067 0.096 0.294 3557 0.117 0.321 3952 0.413 0.492 4903 0.387 0.487 3648 0.192 0.394 4289 0.166 0.372
Educ 3 3067 0.259 0.438 3557 0.267 0.443 3952 0.101 0.301 4903 0.086 0.280 3648 0.247 0.431 4289 0.230 0.421
Experience 3067 25.273 16.773 3557 26.998 17.215 3952 20.472 13.258 4903 26.170 16.875 3648 21.718 14.152 4289 24.426 16.610
Married 2950 0.745 0.436 3447 0.771 0.420 3952 0.606 0.489 4903 0.717 0.450 3648 0.616 0.486 4289 0.696 0.460
No. Kids 0-2 3067 0.133 0.371 3557 0.137 0.378 3952 0.100 0.318 4903 0.107 0.329 3648 0.084 0.289 4289 0.089 0.300
No. Kids 3-5 3067 0.123 0.353 3557 0.120 0.347 3952 0.083 0.287 4903 0.092 0.305 3648 0.078 0.284 4289 0.082 0.288
No. Kids 6-10 3067 0.231 0.519 3557 0.244 0.528 3952 0.156 0.426 4903 0.162 0.429 3648 0.159 0.412 4289 0.169 0.425
No. Kids 11-15 3067 0.225 0.513 3557 0.249 0.536 3952 0.143 0.395 4903 0.159 0.420 3648 0.173 0.444 4289 0.194 0.465
Spouse 1st quartile 2832 0.178 0.383 3283 0.071 0.257 3868 0.276 0.447 4794 0.121 0.326 3622 0.297 0.457 4214 0.064 0.245
Spouse 2nd quartile 2832 0.037 0.189 3283 0.113 0.317 3868 0.000 0.000 4794 0.082 0.274 3622 0.003 0.057 4214 0.103 0.304
Spouse 3rd quartile 2832 0.245 0.430 3283 0.271 0.444 3868 0.088 0.283 4794 0.241 0.428 3622 0.089 0.285 4214 0.234 0.423
Spouse 4th quartile 2832 0.275 0.447 3283 0.305 0.460 3868 0.233 0.423 4794 0.267 0.442 3622 0.224 0.417 4214 0.290 0.454
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1 (continued): Descriptive statistics on samples used 
 
 Portugal  Greece
 Males Females  
            
Males Females
 Obs Mean Std Obs Mean Std Obs Mean Std Obs Mean Std
Employed 2916            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
0.891 0.312 3294 0.628 0.484 1812 0.821 0.384 2746 0.334 0.472
Unemployed 2896 0.055 0.228 3276 0.071 0.258 1812 0.118 0.323 2746 0.105 0.306
Inactive 2916 0.052 0.223 3294 0.298 0.458 1812 0.061 0.240 2746 0.562 0.496
Log(hourly wage) 2578 7.904 0.545 2028 7.815 0.671 1483 8.881 0.516 897 8.775 0.534
Age 2916 36.907 12.524 3294 39.330 12.976 1812 37.414 11.606 2746 40.043 12.919
Educ 1 2916 0.804 0.397 3294 0.765 0.424 1812 0.386 0.487 2746 0.500 0.500
Educ 2 2916 0.126 0.332 3294 0.124 0.329 1812 0.393 0.489 2746 0.354 0.478
Educ 3 2916 0.070 0.255 3294 0.111 0.315 1812 0.221 0.415 2746 0.146 0.354
Experience 2916 21.095 14.189 3294 22.828 16.507 1812 19.094 12.085 2746 24.410 16.965
Married 2916 0.641 0.480 3294 0.723 0.447 1812 0.597 0.491 2746 0.737 0.440
No. Kids 0-2 2916 0.095 0.309 3294 0.104 0.320 1812 0.098 0.333 2746 0.107 0.351
No. Kids 3-5 2916 0.084 0.291 3294 0.094 0.306 1812 0.086 0.288 2746 0.091 0.303
No. Kids 6-10 2916 0.143 0.414 3294 0.163 0.430 1812 0.176 0.467 2746 0.180 0.472
No. Kids 11-15 2916 0.169 0.442 3294 0.199 0.475 1812 0.184 0.463 2746 0.189 0.477
Spouse 1st quartile 2858 0.207 0.405 3205 0.084 0.277 1801 0.250 0.433 2721 0.104 0.306
Spouse 2nd quartile 2858 0.000 0.019 3205 0.141 0.348 1801 0.000 0.000 2721 0.112 0.315
Spouse 3rd quartile 2858 0.193 0.395 3205 0.246 0.431 1801 0.094 0.292 2721 0.251 0.433
Spouse 4th quartile 2858 0.234 0.423 3205 0.245 0.430 1801 0.250 0.433 2721 0.268 0.443
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. The descriptive statistics refer to the base 1999 samples in 1999, excluding self-employed, military and full-time students. Source: PSID and ECHPS. 
Description of variables: 
Employed, unemployed and inactive are self-defined. 
Educ1=1 if Less than grade 12 (US); =1 if Less than upper secondary education (EU). 
Educ2=1 if Grade 12 completed (US); =1 if Upper secondary education completed (EU) 
Educ3=1 if Grade 16 completed (US); =1 if Higher education (EU) 
Experience: Actual full-time or part-time experience in years (US); Current age – age started first job (EU) 
Married=1 if living in couple 
 
Table A2: 
Proportions of imputed wage observations in total nonemployment 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. Figures report the proportion of individuals who were not employed in 1999 but were employed in at least another year in the sample period over the total number of 
nonemployed individuals in 1999. 
 Male Female
USA  0.549 0.517
UK  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
0.478 0.493
Finland 0.534 0.558
Denmark 0.852 0.694
Germany 0.802 0.541
Netherlands
 
0.477 0.378 
Belgium 0.429 0.319
Austria 0.702 0.319
Ireland 0.406 0.312
France 0.740 0.490
Italy 0.523 0.199
Spain 0.545 0.273
Portugal 0.571 0.305
Greece 0.526 0.193
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: 
Aggregate real wage growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. Results from regressions of log gross hourly wages on a linear time trend. Sample: employed males and females aged 16-64, excluding self-employed, military and full-time 
students.  Source: PSID and ECHPS, 1994-2001. 
 
Males  Females
 
Coef. (s.e.) No. obs. R2 Coef. (s.e.) No. obs. R2 
USA    0.021*** 0.002 20317 0 0.023*** 0.002 22376 0.01
UK    
    
    
     
     
    
     
    
     
     
     
    
    
0.025*** 0.002 23963 0.01 0.034*** 0.001 24907 0.02
Finland 0.014*** 0.003 9648 0 0.018*** 0.002 9933 0.01
Denmark 0.022*** 0.002 10762 0.01
 
0.018*** 0.002 10016 0.01
 Germany 0.003* 0.001 35106 0 0.003* 0.001 27904 0
Netherlands
 
0 0.002 20796 0 0.002 0.002 17563 0
Belgium 0.012*** 0.002 9994 0 0.013*** 0.002 8569 0
Austria 0.012*** 0.002 12225 0 0.010*** 0.003 8963 0
Ireland 0.027*** 0.002 11861 0.01 0.035*** 0.003 9276 0.02
France 0.008*** 0.002 20166 0 0.013*** 0.002 16927 0
Italy 0.004*** 0.001 25341 0 0.008*** 0.001 16578 0
Spain 0.013*** 0.001 24119 0 0.009*** 0.002 14246 0
Portugal 0.030*** 0.002 20232 0.01 0.037*** 0.002 15280 0.02
Greece 0.021*** 0.002 13121 0.01 0.022*** 0.002 8110 0.01
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